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I. THEME 
 
THE KIDNAPPING OF THE CHIBOK GIRLS: A RESULT OF A THREAT 
TO MASCULINITIES 
 
II. ABSTRACT 
 
On April 14th, 2014, Boko Haram seized a Governmental School in 
Chibok, abducting 276 girls to force them to convert to Islam. These events have 
thus been examined in accordance to International Security and Governmental 
perspectives. This bachelor dissertation proposes to analyze the response of this 
extremist group to girl education taking as an example the kidnapping 
aforementioned. Following an African Feminist approach, the researcher 
explores the gender constructions of the extremists in regard to what they deem 
to be masculine, and how women empowerment is a threat to their identity. For 
this reason, an explorative methodology is used within a post-colonial approach. 
This avoids generalizations and ill-fitting explanations of the subject of study, 
focusing primarily on its understanding.  
 
Furthermore, before addressing the Chibok abductions, this research 
refers to the international and local context that led to the appearance of Boko 
Haram, emphasizing in the contrasting relation between Westernized 
globalization and a regional fundamentalist revival. Following these arguments, 
this Dissertation considers the socio-political background of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria, centering on the structure in the Northern states, which 
perpetuates patriarchal traditions. Likewise, this analysis is completed by an 
exploration on how masculinity is constructed in a binary perspective, that is in 
terms of the other. In addition, the student contemplates if these Nigerian 
militants would be experiencing a Hegemonic Masculinity crisis, a phenomenon 
that accentuates gender-based violence if male privilege is contested. Finally, 
this investigation ends with an additional examination of the possibility of an 
educational system that empowers both girls and boys against toxic gender 
constructions. 
 
Keywords: Feminism, Power Relations, Masculinities, Women Empowerment, 
Girls’ Education, Nigeria, Boko Haram, Masculinity Crisis, Agency   
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III. RESUMEN 
 
El 14 de abril de 2014, Boko Haram se tomó las instalaciones de la 
Escuela Estatal de Chibok y, consecuentemente, secuestró 276 niñas para 
obligarlas a convertirse al Islam. Desde entonces, estos eventos se han estudiado 
de acuerdo con la Seguridad Internacional y las perspectivas gubernamentales. 
Sin embargo, esta disertación propone el análisis de la respuesta de este grupo 
extremista a la educación de las niñas tomando como ejemplo el rapto antes 
mencionado. Así, siguiendo un acercamiento desde el Feminismo Africano, el 
investigador explora las construcciones de género de los extremistas en función 
de lo que consideran como masculino, y como el empoderamiento de la mujer es 
una amenaza para su identidad. Por este motivo, una metodología de exploración 
se usa de acuerdo a una postura post-colonial. Esto evitaría generalizaciones y 
explicaciones ineficientes sobre el sujeto de estudio, concentrándose de ésta 
manera en su entendimiento. 
 
Además, antes de abordar los secuestros de Chibok, este trabajo se 
refiere al contexto internacional y local, los cuales llevaron a la aparición de 
Boko Haram, enfatizando el contraste entre una globalización occidentalizada y 
un resurgimiento fundamentalista. Siguiendo estos argumentos, esta Disertación 
considera el trasfondo socio-económico de la República Federal de Nigeria, 
centrándose en la Estructura de los estados del norte que perpetúan tradiciones 
patriarcales. Asimismo, este análisis se completa con una exploración sobre 
como la masculinidad se construye en una perspectiva binaria, en términos del 
otro. Adicionalmente, el estudiante contempla si los militantes nigerianos 
experimentarían una Crisis de Masculinidad Hegemónica, la cual acentuaría la 
violencia de género si el privilegio masculino es refutado. Finalmente, la 
investigación termina con un análisis de una posible educación de 
empoderamiento para niños y niñas, contra construcciones tóxicas de género. 
 
Palabras clave: Feminismo, Relaciones de Poder, Masculinidades, 
Empoderamiento Femenino, Educación de Niñas, Nigeria, Boko Haram, Crisis 
de Masculinidad, Agencia  
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IV. RÉSUMÉ 
 
Le 14 avril, 2014, Boko Haram s’est emparé l’école public de Chibok. 
Ensuite, ils ont enlevé 276 filles, lesquelles ont été forcées à se convertir à 
l’Islam. Depuis ce jour, ces événements ont été étudiés d’après la Sécurité 
Internationale et la perspective gouvernementale. Néanmoins, ce mémoire 
propose analyser la réponse de ce groupe extrémiste à l’éducation des filles en 
prenant d’exemple le rapt avant-mentionné. De cette façon, depuis un 
rapprochement du Féminisme Africain, le chercheur explore les constructions du 
genre des extrémistes en accord avec ce qu’ils considèrent comme masculin. 
Aussi, il veut savoir comment l’émancipation des femmes est une menace à leur 
identité. Ce pour cette raison qu’une méthodologie d’exploration est préférée en 
suivant un point de vue postcolonial. Ainsi, cette position éviterait des 
généralisations et des explications inefficientes à propos du sujet d’étude, en se 
concentrant sur leur compréhension. 
 
En outre, avant de s’occuper des enlèvements de Chibok, ce travail fait 
référence au contexte international et local, lesquels ont conduit l’apparition de 
Boko Haram en emphatisant le contraste entre une globalisation d’occident et 
une résurgence fondamentaliste. En suivant ces arguments, ce mémoire 
considère le milieu socio-économique de la République fédérale du Nigeria, en 
mettant au point la Structure des états du nord, ceux qui perpétuent les traditions 
patriarcales. De la même manière, cet analyse est complété avec une exploration 
sur la masculinité compris d’après une vision de binarité, c’est-à-dire selon un 
autre. De plus, l’étudiant contemple la possibilité de l’existence d’une crise de 
Masculinité Hégémonique. Cette idée, par exemple, accentuerait la violence du 
genre si le privilège masculin est contesté. Finalement, cette investigation 
termine avec une analyse d’une possible éducation émancipant pour les garçons 
et les filles, contre les constructions toxiques de genre. 
 
Mots-clés : Féminisme, Relations du Pouvoir, Masculinités, Émancipation 
Féminine, Éducation des Filles, Nigeria, Boko Haram, Crise de Masculinité, 
Agence   
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V. INTRODUCTION 
 
There were more than 40 insurgents at the road block. As each vehicle drove up they 
commanded everyone to come down and identify themselves. When my friends and I 
said we were students, one of the insurgents shouted ‘Aha! These are the people we are 
looking for. So you are the ones with strong-heads who insist on attending school when 
we have said ‘boko’ is ‘haram.’ We will kill you here today.’ – Words from a 19-year-
old Nigerian schoolgirl, Konduga 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 20) 
 
April 14th, 2014: A group of men invaded the Nigerian Government 
Chibok School and snatched 276 girls from this institution. Boko Haram, 
responsible for this assault, alleged that they were saving women from sinful 
western education. As fof 2015, only 57 of these hostages had managed to 
escape (Al Jazeera, 2015; Amnesty International, 2015). Those that stayed at 
their camp, nevertheless, faced a different kind of fate. Forced to wed some of 
the militants (Al Jazeera, 2015; Mazumdar, 2015), these girls were coerced into 
converting to Islam. Deprived from any autonomy, they were treated like slaves 
(Zenn, 2014), and sometimes made to murder prisoners or infidels (Mazumdar, 
2015) and steal nearby Nigerian villages (Levs, 2015). Boko Haram took them 
as if they had a right over their lives. 
 
Regarding the men that abducted them, it must be mentioned that in 2012 
they had been already labeled as the greatest security threat to the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (Onuoha, 2012). Denouncing democracy and secularization, 
Boko Haram stated that their country was condemned because of its corruption. 
These men, previously known as a pacific youth preaching group, opted for 
violence as its frustration accentuated through the years (Okpaga et al., 2012). 
By 2009, these fundamentalists were bombing government buildings in what 
they considered a just jihad (Onuoha, 2012; Amnesty International, 2015). Also 
targeting civilians, this militia group was responsible for the death of around one 
thousand people, and the international displacement of hundreds (Onuoha, 
2012). The conflict began escalating when, on August 26th, 2011, Boko Haram 
conducted a suicide attack on the United Nations’ Nigerian Office, and a 
subsequent assault on the Nigerian Police Headquarters on June 16th (Okpaga et. 
al., 2012). In 2012, with already 950 deaths on their record, a series of bombings 
on the city of Kano resulted in 250 additional deceases (Okpaga et. al., 2012). 
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Furthermore, the number of casualties ascended to 5,500 civilians, by January, 
2014 (Amnesty International, 2015). 
 
Consequently, following these violent manifestations, international 
concern led to academic production regarding diverse aspects of this conflict. 
For instance, Gary and Rubin (2014), consider a psychological perspective to 
analyze the Nigerian militants. The African Institute for Gender (2014) referred 
to the media coverage of the Bring Back Our Girls movement. Likewise, 
Nnabundo Nwabuzor and Verlum Gever (2015) contemplated the media impact 
of the abovementioned campaign. Other perspectives on this group include 
Jordan Smith’s (2015) analysis on gender narrative and Islam, and Peters’ 
(2014) religious explanation on Boko Haram’s attitudes towards women. 
Following these arguments, Shaibu and Salleh (2015) refer to the Nigerian 
fundamentalists’ rise, while Vitório (2015) reflected on the impact of human 
trafficking using a perspective related to security. 
 
Raging from psychology to security, each author gave a perspective on 
the same problem. Yet, the Chibok abductions troubled me differently. Let us, 
for instance, refer to how these girls wished to pursue their studies, how they had 
hoped to further their autonomy, and how they had met a terrible fate by 
committing the unfathomable crime of not following traditions. In utter dismay, 
I have yet to understand to what extent a group of men felt that their very idea of 
masculinity was being challenged by the free will of women. Thus, I decided to 
explore the Nigerian case, as it is a clear example of how unyielding gender 
constructions oppose equality and empowerment in an interconnected world. In 
fact, I believe that the events of April 14th seem to align under a structural 
dilemma in International Relations, which dwells on the contestation of power 
constructions and the role of the agency of each actor. In this manner, I set to 
consider the reasons behind this alleged threat that led this group to deter women 
from choosing something as simple as finishing their studies.  
 
Nevertheless, I must first acknowledge that my research faces certain 
weaknesses, as I cannot access first-hand information regarding Boko Haram 
and the gender constructions in Nigeria. For this reason, I depend on 
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ethnographic and qualitative studies, and past works on the subject. These 
involve, for instance, the publication of History Professor Uchendu (2007) on 
gender in Nigeria, and the report of two local non-governmental organizations; 
the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Programme and Voices for Change 
(2016). I also believe that this investigation is strengthened by the gender 
perspectives it takes. As means of illustration, I am not only considering 
Nigerian women as my subjects of study, but men and their very construction of 
gender identity as well. Thus, this paper proposes a different understanding of 
violence and power as an alternative way to address conflict resolution. 
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that although I refer to this insurgent 
group in terms of its fundamentalist stance, this is not a criticism to their 
religion. Rather, it focuses on their extremism and political agenda.  
 
On this matter, this analysis questions how a patriarchal structure is 
furthered by social practices that perpetuate gender inequality, while reacting 
violently towards a transformative agency that challenges this system. This is 
related to my studies in International Relations, as this research provides a new 
perspective on Conflict Resolution and Security Studies, providing a different 
outlook on the analysis of international affairs, addressing a gender approach 
with non-state actors. Yet, given the exploratory nature of this research, a 
hypothesis was not stated, as it is not necessary for this type of work (Betthyány 
& Cabrera, 2010). Furthermore, I contemplate analyzing the response of the 
extremist group known as Boko Haram to girl education, taking as an example 
the kidnapping of the Chibok girls in 2014. For this reason, I rely on the 
comparing and contrasting research methodology, complemented by a post-
colonial approach that takes into account local perspectives regarding gender 
equality. In accordance to this, I agree with Mohanty (1988, p. 335), who 
believes that research and theory should acknowledge the international balance 
of power, to consider historic processes. Thus, I regard qualitative data, as I 
cannot manipulate any information, while sustaining my analysis on secondary-
source documents. Also, when referring to Western theories, I must stress that 
these are being used through means of exploration, rather than explanation 
(Mohanty, 1988; p. 338) 
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As for my theoretical framework, I rely on the Reflectivism stance of the 
Great Debates in International Relations, which contemplates subjective and 
interpretative data while also conceiving non-state actors and a criticism to 
established structures (Benneyworth, 2011). For this reason, I examine 
Feminism, with special attention to its African counterpart. To illustrate, this 
current emphasizes the voices of black women, while acknowledging that a 
colonial past perpetuates structures of discrimination (2004, p. 130). 
Furthermore, following da Silva (2004, p. 131) Nigerian feminists, such as 
Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, believe that women’s empowerment should oppose 
patriarchal customs, deconstructing stereotypes related to womanhood, which 
involve the goddess or the abnegated mother. Both da Silva and Molara 
Ogundipe-Leslie conceptualize women oppression as a consequence of certain 
traditions that divide men from women (Da Silva, 2004, p. 134). Likewise, 
African feminists believe in a critical appropriation of Western feminism, adding 
it to local perspectives and criticisms. Moreover, African feminists involve men 
in their plight for justice and equality (da Silva, 2004, p. 135).  
 
I also rely on Masculinities Theory to sustain my analysis. Therefore, I 
mostly consider the hierarchy proposed by Connell (2000-2016) to understand 
the plurality of gender constructions and the imposition of a hegemonic ideal 
that shapes men’s identity. Likewise, other theories, such as Kaufman’s (1999) 
study on gender-based violence, Schrock and Schwalbe’s (2009) study on 
manhood acts, and Lemon’s (1995) elaboration on male privilege and the 
subsequent crisis that entails it, are observed. On this, it is important to stress 
that this dissertation understands Masculinity as a socio-political construction 
perpetuated by Patriarchy, according to Bharucha (1995, pg. 1610). It is also 
important to mention that although I refer to Western academic production 
regarding Men’s Studies, I sustain my analysis by contemplating these thesis as 
means of exploration of different phenomena, bearing in mind that they must be 
complemented by other local perspectives. 
 
Consequently, the first chapter, a contextual one, draws the relations that 
construct the structure that influences Nigeria, and further triggers the Nigerian 
extremists’ agency. This serves to analyze the context that lead to the emergence 
	 8 
of Boko Haram. On this matter, the International scenario is marked by two 
main socio-political phenomena. Globalization, a historical process that rendered 
local identities more complex than before, is tinged with a Western influence on 
secularization, democracy and capitalism. Fundamentalism, nevertheless, rises 
as an opposing force to counter a fading identity on a changing society that 
deprives religion of its former political importance. In the manner of contesting 
ideologies, the War on Terror, an outcome of the 9/11 attacks on the United 
States, caused the appearance of Islamophobia. As a response to what is 
different in a Western society, they both undermined the image of the United 
States, particularly in the Muslim World, and, conversely, fueled extremist 
groups like Boko Haram.  
 
For this reason, to properly understand the extremist group’s motives on 
attacking civilians, such as the Chibok schoolgirls, I explore the evolution of 
Boko Haram from a non-violent preaching youth group to an extremist militia. 
Its history is spotted by repression from the government, and the militants’ 
opposition to a secular Republic. Following the extrajudicial execution of the 
group’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram has condemned the corrupted 
state of the Government and therefore sustained their claims for a pure Islamic 
system. Furthermore, on a subsequent discussion of the causes for the existence 
of Boko Haram, I considered economic theories that highlight poverty as its 
triggering factor. I also highlight the importance of contemplating socio-political 
arguments, such as religious tensions in Nigeria and the failed role of the State 
as their main explanation. Boko Haram, thus, is perceived to be the outcome of a 
frustrated identity whose jihad banner is its own religious interpretation. 
 
In the second chapter, to determine the existence of a crisis of 
masculinities originated by the empowerment of women through education, I 
contemplate a theoretical discussion of the foundations for this dissertation 
analysis. Although I consider Western academic production on gender equality, I 
use a Postcolonial Feminist methodology to conceive these studies as 
exploratory tools, rather than inadequate assumptions. Furthermore, I complete 
this analysis of local perspectives on gender construction and Patriarchy 
following an African Feminist stance. Although a brief preamble to Boko 
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Haram’s identity was addressed in Chapter I, this perspective lacked its relation 
to the construction of Masculinity. Therefore, I refer to Connell’s (2000-2016) 
Theory of Masculinity to explore the alleged existence of a Hegemonic 
Masculinity in Nigeria. As a result, some elements that were already analyzed, 
such as the group’s fundamentalist thinking, are explored according to how these 
Nigerian extremists may interpret as a masculine ideal. It appears they follow a 
dichotomous gender perspective, a view which originated from the Islamic 
Indian political personality Mawdudi. In accordance to this perspective, Boko 
Haram would assert its manliness in opposition to the West, God, and women.   
 
Yet, another concept is also drawn into the same scenario. Thus, this 
dissertation refers to Girls’ education following the United Nations’ Millennium 
Development Goals, a successor to the Beijing Declaration of 1995 on Women’s 
rights. As a new perspective on empowerment, it further encourages active and 
transformative agency, i.e. the ability to act in relation to power, to question 
gender norms and cultural traditions. For instance, both ethnographic and 
Nigerian feminist studies consider these customs to be the local representation of 
Patriarchy. Nigerian women, beginning to denounce their very obstacles to 
gender equality, were also changing existing power relations. This, nevertheless, 
triggered a reaction in the men that failed to adapt to this new environment. As a 
crisis of masculinities emerged, it was strengthened by dichotomous 
perspectives on masculinity and femininity. In consequence, fundamentalists, 
such as Boko Haram, dismissed the newly reclaimed autonomy of women, 
labeling it as Western-influenced. Also, vowing to eradicate it and preserve 
moral order, this group eventually reinforced their idea of a masculinity through 
their actions, a phenomenon known as manhood acts, to assert the previous 
status quo. Male privilege, threatened by the contestation of Hegemonic 
Masculinity, causes an opposition to women. 
 
The Third Chapter relates to the methodological comparison between the 
theoretical support drawn on Chapter II, coupled with the historic information of 
Chapter I. The resulting analysis serves to interpret Boko Haram’s terrorist 
response to girls’ empowerment through education. Thus, I contemplate the 
situation of girls regarding education and empowerment in Nigeria. On this, the 
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Nigerian Government seems to praise its efforts regarding its commitment on 
the Third Millennium Development Goal, concerned with gender parity in 
education. Understanding girls’ empowerment as merely school attendance, the 
National Bureau of Statistics (2015) states that equality has been attained, as for 
every boy in a classroom there is also a girl. Nonetheless, when reconsidering 
women’s literacy rates of northern parts of the country, the outlook changes 
drastically. Furthermore, I recall the construction of a binary perspective that 
divides masculine from feminine in this region. In like manner, these patriarchal 
traditions appear to segregate women to the private sphere, while emphasizing 
authority with men.  
 
Therefore, relying on the ethnographic account of victims of Boko 
Haram that were interviewed by Human Rights Watch (2014), a connection 
between unyielding dichotomous ideas on gender and women’s education seems 
likely. For instance, the kidnapping of 276 girls from the Chibok School further 
illustrates a manhood act of gender-based violence. Considering Kaufman 
(1999), I analyze how male privilege is hidden and the threat of its 
disappearance motivates the group’s behavior. Similarly, the final part of 
Chapter III refers to the exploration of a new answer to the Boko Haram 
conflict. Bearing in mind that this solution should prevent further confrontations, 
and is meant to be applied in the long term, I elaborate on the possibility of 
conceiving an empowering feminist education for both men and women. This 
idea should counter patriarchal constructions of what a man is, while at the same 
time motivate both girls and boys to denounce gender roles that are perpetuated 
through culture. By working on the identity of the young, further notions of the 
other can be prevented, and thus, gender equality attained.  
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1. CHAPTER I: THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE USE OF TERROR AS A 
TOOL OF OPPRESSION BY BOKO HARAM 
 
“No one is more arrogant toward women, more aggressive or scornful, 
than the man who is anxious about his virility” as Simone de Beauvoir would 
say. Recalling the abduction of the Chibok girls leads us to question the power 
relations that encouraged this insurgent group to claim ownership over these 
women. Yet, to accomplish this task, one must look to the past, even to that 
which seemingly holds no connection to current events. Thus, the specific 
objective for this background chapter would be to analyze the context that lead 
to the emergence of Boko Haram. 
 
Accordingly, I have chosen to compare and contrast secondary-source 
bibliography to analyze the context that led to the emergence of Boko Haram. 
This chapter is thus divided into three parts: the first one deals with the 
international phenomena prior to its appearance; the second one with the historic 
evolution of the aforementioned group; and finally, the last one refers to the 
religious interpretations that serve as a basis to Boko Haram. 
 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, the International 
Community witnessed the emergence of a new conflict, the War on Terror. 
Fueled by Islamophobia, the United States’ crusade condemned Islam as a 
Terrorist movement. Consequently, the Muslim world criticized the West as it 
further triggered fundamentalists stances, and provided the support needed for 
groups like Boko Haram to thrive.  
 
In today’s Nigeria, Globalization, a historic process that involves 
interconnection and diversity, could sometimes threaten local identities as they 
struggle to remain in a changing society. On the other hand, Fundamentalism 
can be seen as a reaction force that seeks to assert religious recognition on a 
moving scenario. These opposing notions will influence Boko Haram as a 
whole, and provide the basis for its behavior. Therefore, I rely on the theory of 
Naim (2009) and Held et al. (1999) for the socio-political conception of 
Globalization as a historic process influenced by the West. Likewise, Emerson 
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and Hartman’s (2006) study on fundamentalism is used, mainly to exemplify a 
Western perspective on religion and secularization. 
 
History and the ongoing evolution of Boko Haram reflects an evolution 
that has been marked by both an international and local context. Starting as a 
non-violent preaching group, Boko Haram opposed the democratic Nigerian 
State and started using violence to halt its advance. Attacking government 
buildings, they also targeted the United Nations compound, and shifted their aim 
to civilians as well. I therefore consider the data collected from ACLED (2015) 
on casualties caused by the Boko Haram conflict, and the historic information of 
Maiangwa et al. (2012) and Onuaha (2009), the latter giving a local perspective 
from the National Defence College in Nigeria. 
 
On a historic matter, identity and religion are both based on a common 
background, and in the final part of this chapter I will review the fundamentalist 
rise in Nigeria, characterized by Boko Haram’s predecessor, Maitatsine. 
Moreover, I address the group’s founder responsibility for the creation of their 
religious stance. Misunderstanding Islam, Yusuf considers different conservative 
Islamic teachings to construct the fanatic militants’ identity. I must, therefore, 
rely on Onuaha (2010), Adesoji (2011), and Thurston (2016) to analyze and 
explore fundamentalism. 
 
1.1. The international context where it flourished  
 
The international context that is drawn around Boko Haram and Nigeria 
includes a series of events that are included in social, political and economic 
phenomena proper of the times preceding the Nigerian movement. Hence, it is 
important to highlight two main circumstances that influenced the current 
scenario where Boko Haram operates: globalization and the War on Terror. Both 
of these ideas greatly influenced the structure that triggered the agency of Boko 
Haram, and further defined the conflict. 
 
Societies in the United States, for instance, experienced globalization 
arguably along their history as a consequence of evolution that promised a more 
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interconnected world for both markets and democracies. Parallel to this 
occurrence, the United States also fueled a new idea known as Islamophobia as 
a result of the attacks on 9/11. Accordingly, a new war was declared by former 
President W. Bush against terrorist groups, depicting the enemy as the Muslim 
people: The War on Terror.  
 
Yet, the International Community was witness to another phenomenon. 
African and Middle-Eastern societies experienced the success of religious 
fundamentalism, as a contestation to the above-mentioned stance on 
globalization that threatened to send their spiritual identity into oblivion. These 
ideas paved the way to the alleged greatest security threat to the Nigerian State. 
 
During the Cold War, the world did not foresee the importance of 
constructing an identity, and blinded by a primal American world view, we did 
not consider the impact it could have on a different culture. Thus, academics 
such as Emerson and Hartman (2006), have claimed that development and 
modernization are a consequence to secularization; they deem religion as an 
outdated characteristic of an age long passed (Emerson & Hartman, 2006; p. 
127-128).  
 
Nevertheless, this was not the case for every social group. Believing in 
homogenization, or rather, in globalization, the Power elites only considered 
their perspective as an unquestionable truth. This applies, for instance, to the 
experience of the United States. Emerson and Hartman (2006), both academics 
to the Rice University in Texas, reflect their country’s opinions on religion as 
underdevelopment. Consequently, those groups that resisted the so-called 
progress of globalization, stress their religious identity becoming 
fundamentalists. For instance, Ahmed (2006; p. 27) notes that this is a trend in 
today’s Pakistan with more groups emerging to support the actions of the 
Taliban. 
 
Fundamentalism, thus, could be envisioned as a contestation force to a 
threat of loss of identity. Yet, it is important to note that this term involves an 
orthodox stance of religion, not precisely including devotion in itself (Emerson 
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and Hartman, 2006; p. 130-131), becoming a reaction to a modernizing world 
that threatens their worldview. Likewise, Emerson and Hartman (2006; p. 129) 
define it as a contextual phenomenon that responds to the XX century. It is also 
important to note that on this dissertation, modernization in political terms, 
refers to democracy, as it would be a point of discussion concerning Boko 
Haram.  
 
As an opposing force, Globalization conceived under the perspective of 
the United States, is a social and historic process that results in the interaction of 
a diverse set of people and ideas, which, in theory, would relativize religion 
(Emerson & Hartman, 2006; p. 129), degrading it as a personal belief that holds 
no power and importance in Society (Emerson & Hartman, 2006; p. 130).  
 
The universalism espoused by Globalization, is, in fact, a way to assert 
an alleged superiority of the West over its others (Amorós, 2004; p. 68), which, 
according to Amorós (2004, p. 68), excludes minorities, women and different 
religions. Fundamentalists, as a result, react to the marginalization of their 
religion, usually, to western values of democracy and secularization (Emerson & 
Hartman, 2006; p. 134).  
 
Nonetheless, a fundamentalist stance selectively defends elements of a 
religion that serve specific interests, instead of including it as a whole (Emerson 
& Hartman, 2006; p. 134). Likewise, people belonging to fundamentalist groups 
believe that they are the only ones chosen by God, and those that do not support 
them are seen as enemies (Emerson & Hartman, 2006; p. 134). Furthermore, 
these groups are centered on a charismatic persona that dictates the behavior for 
all of their members (Emerson & Hartman, 2006; p. 134). 
 
For instance, the Iranian Revolution could serve as an example to 
Fundamentalism. Kurzman (1996; p. 157) argues that one of the elements that 
led to the Iranian Revolution prior 1977 were the reforms furthered by the 
Shah’s monarchy. The social group most affected by these reforms were the 
Islamic clerics (Kurzman, 1996; p. 157), for the Shah adopted a secularization 
stance that casted them aside from their traditional roles in the judiciary system, 
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and education in Iran (Kurzman, 1996; p. 157). As it would be further explored, 
Boko Haram shares these perspectives on Fundamentalism and also the fear of 
being neglected in a changing society regarding secularization policies.  
 
Fundamentalism believes in traditions and in a literal interpretation of 
religion. Nevertheless, its counterpart, Globalization, is based upon 
universalism. As stated by Emerson and Hartman (2006), Globalization is 
considered under a Western conception. Therefore, on this dissertation, the 
United States is given primary importance, due to its clearly opposite position if 
compared to Boko Haram.  
 
Globalization, an enduring phenomenon in the global stage, involves 
interconnections between countries and also the impact they have on the lives of 
civil society and the State (Held et al., 1999; p. 484). Likewise, Held et al. 
(1999, p. 485) commented that this process is based upon exchange, as diversity 
and cultural interactions are namely their causes (2004, p. 69-70). As a result, 
the communication of many cultures and points of views render an exclusivist 
stance obsolete. This should be considered when relating Globalization and 
Fundamentalism as opposites. 
 
Although some historians argue that Globalization is a process that has 
existed since the first contact between nomadic peoples, Naím (2009; p. 29) 
argues that this is a new historical outcome starting in 1990. Given the 
importance to new disruptive technologies, this era bears witness to how the 
Internet impacts the lives of people, creating diverse connections that influence 
their identities. Also, Held et al. (1999; p. 486) claim that although many of the 
cultural products resulting from cultural globalization originate from the United 
States, this should not be identified as cultural imperialism.  
 
The author also asserts that companies, and thus the capitalist world 
view, are the great engines behind globalization. Furthermore, some theorists 
assure that it is a strategy to extend the influence of the United States (Naím, 
2009; p. 30). This is the opinion of Amorós (2004) when considering 
universalism as a tool of dominion from the West. Yet, this phenomenon offers 
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an opportunity to diversify opposing ideologies to that of the United States 
(Naím, 2009; p. 30). Also, on a different outlook on Globalization, Rosamond 
(2003; p. 663) argues that one of the perspectives for this phenomenon is 
Europeanization. Globalization, therefore, is constructed around a colonial past 
that stems from an Illustrative stance (Amorós, 2004; p. 69-70). 
 
Moreover, Kellner (2002; p. 286) argues that the concept of 
Globalization may be both criticized or praised. The author notes, for instance, 
that its critics see it as a homogenization phenomenon that served the capitalist 
order, where the developed nations would take advantage of poor countries. 
Other theorists believe that globalization, in fact, brings a promise of freedom, 
democracy, and happiness. Furthermore, relating it as an ideal state would lead 
countries to seek, for instance, secularization.  
 
Held et al. (1999; p. 495), nevertheless, assessed that Globalization has 
actually increased the already existing division between rich and poor States. In 
fact, it finds its bases, as per Kellner (2002; p. 287), in both technology and the 
global economy, which in turn help to create networks between societies. 
Kellner (2002; p. 288) also affirms that this occurrence, from an economic 
perspective, consists in the continuity of social tendencies of the logic of capital. 
Or as Fukuyama (1992) and Friedman (1999) believe, it is the triumph of free 
market and western values, like secularization. Globalization, therefore, is a 
contradictory process as it promotes both capitalism and democracy (Kellner, 
2002; p. 292).  
 
Kellner (2002, p. 289) also denotes the existence of technocapitalism 
which involves both the capitalist ideology and the thriving force of technology 
(Kellner, 2002; p. 289). Therefore, an enduring capitalism is deemed as the 
hegemonic force (Kellner, 2002; p. 289) that supports a universalist perspective. 
Moreover, as per Rosamond (2003, p.667), Globalization in itself also includes 
human action besides economy. This circumstance can also be defined as the 
interconnection between capitalism and democracy, which has negative and 
positive effects for individuals. On the one hand, it is seen primarily as a form of 
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legitimation of an ideological discourse. On the other hand, it offers 
opportunities to develop new political participation (Kellner, 2002; p. 290).  
 
However, in this paper, I use Naim’s (2009) perspective on 
Globalization, as it states that it did not erase nationalism or national identities; 
it only caused them to be more complex. Amorós (2004) opinions on cultural 
influence are worth noting, as it exemplifies how the West tends to universalize 
its values, such as democracy and capitalism, as an ideal to attain. In fact, 
Kellner (2002) already mentioned that Globalization can also be seen as a 
desirable outcome for countries. Moreover, Naim’s perspective should be 
coupled with Held et al.’s (1999) critique on the interaction of different cultures. 
This constitutes the definition I will use on my research from now on, especially 
when referring to the West and Boko Haram.  
 
As for the fear of homogenization of different identities, it is important 
to address a different problem that also fuels Fundamentalism. The Western 
perspective of Globalization is closely related to the idea of secularization, as it 
was demonstrated by Emerson and Hartman (2006, p. 127 – 128). Therefore, 
misunderstanding other religions may lead to conflict. In the following part of 
this chapter, I analyze Islamophobia as an element in Western societies. A 
concept that dates back to the late 1990s, it is conceived primarily as a political 
idea by activists, such as the NGO Runnymede, and it now involves a pledge to 
draw attention to anti-Muslim or anti-Islamic sentiments (Baleich, 2012; p. 180).  
 
Islamophobia first appeared in the 1997 Runnymede Trust report, 
Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. This Britain-based NGO for cultural 
relations foreshadowed the existence of the term that, since 2001, has been used 
by the media, civil society and NGOs (Baleich, 2012; p. 180) to identify 
hostility towards what is different from a Western, globalization-inspired, point 
of view. Baleich (2012; p. 182) defines it as the negative sentiments and 
attitudes directed indiscriminately at Islam and its followers. Likewise, this is 
also a result on the so-called Global War on Terror, an aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks on the United States.  
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As Awan (2010; p. 522) argues, the fight against terror was led on 
different fronts, such as the media that promoted a martyr image of the United 
States, coupled with its then-heroic depiction of freedom defender. Awan (2010; 
p. 523) then compares the literary and artistic production following 9/11 as an 
ideological indoctrination, that ingrained hatred towards Muslim people. The 
author states that a power elite justifies Islamophobia with a terrorist discourse. 
On that account, the consequences of this hateful rhetoric are the denial of civil 
liberties to Muslim citizens in the United States, as well as attacks on their 
cultural and religious symbols elsewhere in Europe (Awan, 2010; p. 526). This 
portrayal of Islam tends to bind it to the idea of Terrorism, stereotyping the 
Muslim community (Awan, 2010; p. 527). 
 
Using the discourse of the war on terror, the new stance on security 
matters espoused by former President W. Bush after the attacks on September 11 
2001, the United States has imposed their idea on different countries (Rajwade, 
2006; p. 4863). Take for instance the invasion of Iraq, an alleged suspect of the 
attacks. The United States has since then tortured suspects, and violated Human 
Rights, while failing to defend the supposed democratic principles they sought 
to share (Rajwade, 2006; p. 4863). Furthermore, their image was compromised 
after the Congress discovered no real connection between Iraq and Al-Qaeda, 
while the alleged weapons of mass destruction were never found. The Bush 
administration, after finding no threat in Iraq, justified the Invasion in this 
country as their mission to bring democracy to that region (Rajwade, 2006; p. 
4864). Thus, the consequences of this War on Terror are that both prestige and 
credibility for the United States was lessened, particularly in the Muslim World 
(Rajwade, 2006; p. 4865).  
 
In the first part of the dissertation, I attempted to emphasize concepts that 
supported the rise of Boko Haram. Given the international movement of 
globalization, Islamophobia and the War on Terror, these notions are relevant to 
first identify the construction of Boko Haram’s identity, as they constitute the 
International structure that influences Nigeria. Furthermore, they held especial 
importance relating the group’s opposition to the West, as a pivotal element to 
assert their masculinity. Globalization, on the other hand, is seen as a threat to 
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their values, and it is complete disapproval by Boko Haram. This group, as it 
would be seen, condemns Western values, especially the ones regarding 
democracy and education.  
 
The War on Terror and the Islamophobia found in Western societies 
triggered an opposition to the United States, as its image was undermined in the 
Muslim World. Boko Haram would, therefore, support their actions on an 
alleged opposition to these Western values. By condemning the Western 
Globalization process, this extremist group seeks to assert their identity in a 
changing scenario. This crisis originated on the construction of the masculine 
ideal and has been present ever since. 
 
1.2. The Historic Evolution of Boko Haram 
 
On an international level, the context of this conflict depended on social-
political phenomena that revolved around both Globalization and 
Fundamentalism. As opposing ideas, they define the actions of Boko Haram in 
the construction of its identity. In a local context, however, Nigeria’s history of a 
colonial past serves as the background where these militants act. According to 
the Commonwealth (2017), Nigeria was characterized by the interaction of 
Christian missionaries and a growing Muslim Empire in the early XIX century. 
By 1861, Great Britain annexed Lagos, and gained control over Nigeria in 1900 
(The Commonwealth, 2017). In 1960, following successive constitutions, 
Nigeria claimed its independence (The Commonwealth, 2017). Several military 
coups ensued and marked the country’s history until the return of civilian rule in 
1999 (The Commonwealth, 2017). The new Constitution proposed a secular 
Federal Republic, while envisioning the possibility of Sharia law for Muslim 
people (The Commonwealth, 2017). This is the setting for the evolution analysis 
proposed in this part.  
 
Consequently, the history of Boko Haram, whose name roughly 
translates to Western Education is Anathema, involves the continuing violence 
between the militants and the Nigerian State. A conflict marked by casualties on 
both sides, a quest for identity and the use of violence, starts as a non-violent 
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group that subsequently opted to use brutality as a statement of their power. 
Their opposition to democracy and the West, represented by the United Nations 
and education policies for girls, escalated throughout their evolution. 
Accordingly, the background information provided is important to analyze the 
crisis of Masculinities that Boko Haram experienced.  
 
TABLE No. 1 
Number of fatalities in the Boko Haram Conflict per State and Year 
State 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Abuja 0 68 40 0 100 
Adamawa 0 21 76 66 310 
Bauchi 3 11 44 3 32 
Benue 0 0 0 18 0 
Borno 28 238 476 918 2513 
Edo 0 0 7 0 0 
Gombe 0 4 24 6 50 
Jigawa 0 0 1 0 0 
Kaduna 0 0 137 0 174 
Kano 0 6 293 63 246 
Katsina 0 7 0 0 0 
Kogi 0 0 33 0 0 
Lagos 0 0 0 0 4 
Niger 0 10 11 0 3 
Plateau 32 6 20 0 193 
Sokoto 0 6 6 0 0 
Taraba 0 0 4 0 0 
Yobe 2 191 181 111 255 
Source: ACLED, 2015 
   Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
  
For instance, the data collected from the Armed Conflict Location & 
Event Data Project (ACLED, 2015), a public assortment of information 
regarding violence within States, shows the evolution of the casualties in the 
Boko Haram conflict. Regarding, for example, the Borno State, one may find 
that in 2010, Boko Haram caused 28 deaths. This number escalated to 2,513 
deaths in 2014. Moreover, this is the State where the abductions occurred, 
seemingly the most affected by Boko Haram. This data stresses the importance 
of understanding the evolution of Boko Haram and its use of violence to 
properly comprehend this group. 
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The origins of Boko Haram, whose real name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna 
Lidda'awati wal-Jihad or People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s 
Teachings and Jihad (Krech, 2011; p. 132), are traced back to Maiduguri, Borno 
State, in 2002: a youth Islamic group declared that the above-mentioned city, 
and the Islamic Institution, were corrupted beyond repair (Walker, 2012; p. 3), 
by their political leaders who abided by money and not by a true devotion to 
Islam.  
 
Yet, according to Onuaha (2010; p. 55) this group has existed since 1995 
under different names, known mostly as the Nigerian Taliban, Yusufiyyah sect, 
and more recently, Boko Haram. No longer a youth group, it believes that the 
Nigerian State now lies on the hands of corrupted Muslims (Walker, 2012; p. 1). 
Its first registered attack happened in 2003, when the group assailed public 
buildings and police stations in the towns of Geiam and Kanamma, Yobo State 
(Onuaha, 2010).  
 
In relation to what was addressed in the first part of this chapter, it is 
important to recall Maiangwa et al.’s (2012, p. 45) findings. Boko Haram was 
founded to counter the ever-growing globalization in Nigeria, whose corrupted 
teachings could not be implemented in the Muslim idiosyncrasy, according to 
the former founder, Mohammed Yusuf (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 45). Thus, 
Boko Haram pledged to Islamize Nigeria and deviate it from a corrupt political 
system and moral wrongdoing (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 45). 
 
Their quest for their alleged salvation consisted in a political agenda that 
exemplified this group’s interests. For instance, their demands consisted in the 
creation of an Islamic State, ruled by an unaltered Sharia Law. Likewise, they 
ask for justice and prosecution to those responsible of the extrajudicial 
executions of their members in 2009, year when a major dispute with 
governmental forces led to the subsequent killing of its militants and founder 
(Maiangwa et al., 2012; p 42). Moreover, Boko Haram insists on the release of 
their captive members (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p 42).  
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In addition, these militants have vowed to eradicate Western elements 
and values that are incongruent with Islamic societies. These are the secular 
stance of the government, and its affiliation to “westernized” educational system 
and capitalist economy. To illustrate, Walker (2012, p. 7) notes that they are 
against the yan boko, Nigerians known to have benefitted from the policy of 
indirect rule once Great Britain colonized Nigeria. They are considered traitors, 
who turned their backs on Allah because of money and Western influence 
(Walker, 2012; p. 7).  
 
Moreover, their objectives as a group are based upon the constitution of a 
pure Islamic State. Likewise, their antagonism to the Federal Nigerian Republic 
is founded on a condemnation of alleged political and moral corruption that has 
deviated people from true Islam. Nevertheless, it is also important to consider 
the evolution of its tactics in its war against the State. For instance, Krech (2011, 
p. 133) states that Boko Haram has been increasingly related to Al-Qaeda, as 
their training and strategies are similar to that group’s. Although this dissertation 
does not focus mainly on this aspect, the following section of this chapter will 
contemplate their expansion of violence. 
 
Starting in 2001, Boko Haram has used bomb attacks on a weekly basis 
in the North-eastern part of the country (Walker, 2012; p. 1). This year became a 
turning point for its actions, although authors claim the reason is yet obscure to 
the public. In 2003, Boko Haram had a conflict against police officers over a 
local pond because of fishing rights. This episode resulted in the group seizing 
the police officers’ weapons. Then, the police cornered the group in their 
Mosque, culminating in the killing of 70 of its members, including Mohammed 
Ali, a former leader (Walker, 2012; p. 3).  
 
The group’s survivors then returned to Maiduguri, under the leadership 
of Mohammed Yusuf, to set up their own Mosque. Overlooked by authorities, 
Boko Haram continued to expand its influence over the states of Bauchi, Yobe 
and Niger (Walker, 2012; p. 3). It could be discussed, as it was in the first part of 
this chapter, that their violent actions are a consequence of a loss of identity to 
the secular Nigerian State and the globalization phenomenon. Moreover, their 
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hatred towards the Government was furthered due to the indiscriminate use of 
violence by the Security Forces, stressing their division and hostility.  
 
In 2007, Sheikh Ja’afar Mahmoud Adam, a Muslim cleric in Maiduguri, 
was murdered under Yusuf’s order because of his preaching against the fanatic 
behavior of Boko Haram (Walker, 2012; p. 4). Walker (2012; p. 4) stated that 
this may be seen as the turning point for Boko Haram, as it marks their 
detachment from the mainstream Islamic establishment. Additionally, their 
violent actions were marked with extremism, as since 2009, Boko Haram has 
been fueled by hatred to the Nigerian State, a direct result of its suppressive 
tactics on defense and security (Walker, 2012; p. 2).  
 
Their separation from both the State and the mainstream Islamic 
institutions increased their radical stances. The group then withdrew from 
Maiduguri on a hijra, or migration, settling in Kanama village, in the Yobe state. 
In 2009, following an argument with the police, the Bauchi government hunted 
down members that were alleged supporters of Boko Haram, with seven hundred 
people arrested. The group started threatening the police with violence, and 
actually seized Maiduguri for three days. Once the government regained control 
of the city, it started looking for Boko Haram suspects or sympathizers, killing 
them without due trial (Walker, 2012; p. 4). It is also alleged that Police Officers 
murdered Yusuf in this way, although officials state otherwise (Walker, 2012; p. 
4). This would further illustrate the aforementioned oppression used by the 
Nigerian Government, whose extrajudicial killings only encouraged a sentiment 
of hatred towards the State. 
 
 If people in Maiduguri were suspected of having a connection with Boko 
Haram, they were handed to the police, and presumably killed by them, 
according to Walker (2012; p. 4). For instance, a local journalist stated that the 
number of people that disappeared in this manner ascended to 100 (Walker, 
2012; p. 4). During this period, Walker (2012; p. 4) affirmed that the group 
attracted the attention of the global jihadist movement and other rebel groups. In 
2010, Boko Haram returned to Maiduguri increasing their violent behavior, as a 
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result of the repression the government used against them. Thus, their first 
attacks primarily focused on police checkpoints in Borno and Yobe.  
 
Nevertheless, Boko Haram later expanded its targets to civilians. On 
Christmas Eve, approximately half dozen bombs exploded on two churches in 
two districts of Jos, Plateau State (Walker, 2012; p. 4). In 2011, a senior member 
of Boko Haram, known as Abu Dujana, told Walker (2012; p. 4) that anyone 
declared as enemy to Boko Haram would be killed. Thus, the extremists started 
robbing banks and businesses, claiming spoils of war (Walker, 2012; p. 5). In 
2011, the group bombed the national police headquarters in Abuja and the 
United Nations compound in the same city (Walker, 2012; p. 5-6). Furthermore, 
the Duke University Press (2012; p. 17) argues that this attack on the UN 
compound denotes a possible affiliation with al-Qaeda. In the same year, Boko 
Haram had killed at least six hundred people in Nigeria, a figure that doubles in 
the first trimester of 2012 (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p 42). Also in this year, Boko 
Haram set twelve public schools on fire, forcing around 10,000 students out of 
education (Walker, 2012; p. 6). 
 
In addition, these militants allegedly had a political support from the two 
main political parties in Nigeria that planned to use the group for their own 
means (Duke University, 2012; p. 16): the People’s Democratic Party and the 
All Nigeria People’s Party initially financed their activities (Duke University, 
2012; p. 16). Moreover, Walker (2012; p. 3-4) argues that its funding may have 
come from wealthy Nigerians from the Northern states, or external sources in 
Saudi Arabia, a result of Yusuf’s travel to that country. Yet, for weaponry, Boko 
Haram relied on looting after attacks on Police forces. They also smuggled them 
from the Libyan conflict (Duke University, 2012; p. 16).  
 
Boko Haram’s opposition to the Nigerian State is based upon their denial 
of the constitutional privileges granted to women and homosexuals, considering 
them as Nigerian citizens, and the liberal democracy in general (Maiangwa et 
al., 2012; p. 46). Thus, they consolidated their objective: to constitute a pure 
Islamic State (Walker, 2012; p. 2) that sustains its society with a fundamental 
interpretation of the Quran in Nigeria. Their political agenda explained, I must 
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highlight that both a social and economic thesis attempt to illustrate their 
existence. For instance, to the Duke University Press (2012; p. 16), Boko Haram 
was the byproduct of an economic division between the wealthy oil-producer 
South, and the poverty-stricken North. This phenomenon is complemented by 
the demographic boom that caused unemployment for young adults, and 
vulnerable to the lure of shelter provided by the group (Duke University, 2012; 
p. 16). Furthermore, Walker (2012, p. 3) agrees with this thesis, as he claims that 
the strained situation is consequently aggravated by the militant’s youth 
enrollment, in the same way that it attracts jobless Nigerians and war refugees 
from Chad through providing its welfare handouts, food and shelter (Walker, 
2012; p. 3). Therefore, the welcoming promise to better living conditions 
seemed to spark their interest. 
 
Notwithstanding, a solely economic theory seems incomplete if it does 
not contemplate social and political arguments. For example, according to 
Walker (2012; p. 2), weak institutions in Nigeria had led to consider violence the 
only way to counter a security threat. This is furthered by Donnelly (2011; p. 
29), who argues that President Goodluck had an opportunity to end the conflict 
with Boko Haram in 2009, once its leader Yusuf was captured. Yet, this 
opportunity was lost when the founder was killed in custody (Donnelly, 2011; p. 
29). Boko Haram is therefore deemed a symptom of failing governance and 
religious and ethnic tensions between groups in Nigeria (Donnelly, 2011; p. 30).  
 
In other perspectives, Maiangwa et al. (2012; p. 41) address the existence 
of Boko Haram by proposing two different explanations: the state-failure and the 
frustration-aggression premises. According to Maiangwa et al. (2012; p. 42), the 
elements that would explain the arrival of Boko Haram are inadequate security, 
corruption of power elites, and police brutality among others. They argue that 
Boko Haram is the consequence of the failing Nigerian State to provide goods 
and services to its citizens (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 43-44) which also fuels 
frustration with the repressive and violent actions of the government. 
Accordingly, as stated above, Boko Haram is able to lure the impoverished 
youth with new opportunities. The authors, thus, state that non-state actors may 
exploit this situation to gain loyalty from a sector of the population.  
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The state-failure thesis mentioned before relates to the current state of 
affairs, in which the Government does not meet basic needs for Nigerians. These 
include shelter, food, primary health care, education and jobs for the people 
(Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 50). To illustrate this argument, I use the Human 
Development Index or HDI. As an indicator of the United Nations, the HDI for 
Nigeria ranks this country 152 with an index of 0.514 (UNDP, 2015). This 
measures the role of the Nigerian State concerning health, education, inequality, 
gender, employment and security. Furthermore, the data provided by the United 
Nations Development Programme (2015) illustrates a minimum increase of the 
HDI, further demonstrating a lack of investment on human development. 
 
CHART No. 1 
Nigeria’s Human Development Index Evolution from 2010 to 2014 
Source: UNDP, 2015 
 Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
 
It is important to note that as a researcher, I consider this thesis as an 
important economic explanation to Boko Haram’s existence. Yet, I regard the 
frustration-aggression thesis as an element of analysis due to its importance in 
the construction of the identity of militants, which would be coupled with their 
idea of masculinity. This thesis proposed by Maiangwa et al. (2012; p. 44) state 
that marginalized groups that share common pains and an identity will 
experience a surge of violence as a result of their dissatisfaction. Maiangwa et 
al. (2012; p. 49) state that the ruling elite in Nigeria has been driven by greed 
0,48
0,485
0,49
0,495
0,5
0,505
0,51
0,515
0,52
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
	 27 
instead of service to its people, stressing division in Nigeria, and fueling the 
disenchantment of groups like Boko Haram. 
 
As per Walker (2012; p. 1), dialogues with this group are deemed 
difficult as it has many fractions, which would not guarantee the representation 
of all members. The Goodluck administration preference to extrajudicial killings 
would further strain dialogue between militants and government officials 
(Walker, 2012; p. 1), which would prevent conflict resolution. This is the 
situation the Nigerian Government faced when the abduction of the Chibok Girls 
occurred: tensions between extremists and security forces, marked by violence 
and brutality.  
 
The historic evolution of Boko Haram further illustrates their plight with 
an unyielding identity, contrasted with a changing country. Nigeria, facing both 
fundamentalism and globalization, is the battlefield for this group. Confronted 
by injustice and extrajudicial killings, Boko Haram thus believes that the only 
way to purge the rampant corruption in the country, and its moral decay, would 
be with the Sharia Law and an Islamic State (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 50). This 
led them to attack the Government first, the United Nations, and finally 
civilians. Nevertheless, their religious perspective on Islam is not yet considered. 
This serves as an element on the construction of both their identity and their 
violent behavior. The first part of this chapter already addressed the 
fundamentalist opinion which will be further addressed in next part. 
 
1.3. Boko Haram’s religious interpretations as supposed arguments to their 
behavior 
 
Analyzing Boko Haram involves, as it was seen above, a brief coverage 
of both international and local contexts. This is a history of an escalating conflict 
between the Nigerian State and this extremist group. Elements like the War on 
Terror, and religious fundamentalism stressed the construction of a fanatic 
identity, whose aim is to fully implement Islam and the Sharia Law to all States, 
and therefore save Nigeria from the alleged unscrupulousness of democracy. 
Therefore, a focal point of analysis must be the exploration of the religious 
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arguments that Boko Haram used as a banner on their jihad against the 
Government and civilians, especially women.  
 
Nevertheless, I must stress that this research does not focus on a 
denunciation to Islam, but rather to the political and extremist stance of certain 
groups that use religion as a platform to further their interests. Consequently, 
Islam must not be misunderstood as Fundamentalism. To illustrate this, Danjibo 
(2009; p. 3) marks the difference between these two concepts. He defines Islam 
by emphasizing the word Salam, which would translate as peace; it is the belief 
of one’s submission to the Will of Allah based upon five pillars, which are: 
belief in one monotheistic God, prayer, fasting, arms giving, and pilgrimage to 
Mecca (Danjibo, 2009; p. 4). This dissertation does not address Islam as a 
religion nor its cultural impact as a whole. Au contraire, the criticism of this 
work focuses mainly on the identity of Boko Haram, and therefore, its political 
agency. 
 
Therefore, I draw attention to Thurston’s (2016; p. 8-9) statement on 
Boko Haram’s emergence, as the author clarifies that their existence cannot be 
explained solely by demography, poverty or marginalization of the northern part 
of Nigeria. Rather, he emphasizes that Boko Haram is the consequence of 
political and ideological elements proper from Northern states. This is in 
accordance to Maiangwa et al.’s (2012) conclusion on how frustration drives a 
certain type of agency. Hence, I will try to explore a more complex element of 
Boko Haram’s identity. To this end, Fundamentalism shall be considered as a 
countering reaction to secularization.  
 
As previously noted, Boko Haram’s actions are aimed to undermine a 
growing globalization trend in Nigeria, interpreting this as democracy and 
capitalism. On this matter, I use Danjibo’s (2009; p. 1-3) findings on political 
affairs, as he states that Western Societies emphasize secularization in the State. 
It is argued that religion must be displaced to a secondary role or disappear 
altogether. Led by Marxian thought, social theorists ignored the importance of 
faiths (Danjibo, 2009; p. 3), and failed to foreshadow the conflict this would 
provoke concerning identity and the actions of certain groups of people.  
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Boko Haram illustrates this conflict and proves the consequences it could 
have. Priding themselves in being the true and only representation of Islam in 
this country, these fanatic militants do not fit with the reportedly secular 
Republic of Nigeria. For this reason, I believe that as with their violent 
evolution, their religious views are the outcomes of history and power relations 
in this country. For this reason, let us reflect on Adesoji (2011; p. 101-104), an 
author who presents the elements and different perspectives that led to the rise of 
fundamentalism in Nigeria, starting his discussion with an antecessor to Boko 
Haram in the eighties.  
 
The Maitatsine, according to Adesoji (2011; p. 101-104) were the result 
of both economic and social factors. As with Boko Haram, these militants were 
known because of their violent acts. For instance, this group’s name comes from 
a Hausa word meaning the one who damns, a reference to its founder, 
Muhammadu Marwa. Indeed, Marwa was characterized by his hostility to the 
Nigerian State, to Western technology, and by his tendency to use curses 
(Adesoji, 2011; p. 101). This information draws a first connection: 
Fundamentalism in Nigeria, since the beginning, was closely related to an 
enduring opposition to the West.  
 
In the same manner as Boko Haram, the Maitatsine were first considered 
a consequence of poverty. For instance, Adesoji quotes the economic distress 
thesis espoused by Lubeck (1985) so as to illustrate the emergence of the 
followers of this group. Known as the Yan Tatsi, Marwa’s supporters were 
gardawa, scribe’s disciples, who lived on the charity of pious Muslims. 
Accordingly, this theory proposes the oil boom of the seventies as an 
aggravating element for the Northern states (Adesoji, 2011; p. 102). To 
illustrate, the new capitalist Nigerian perspective stressed economic deprivation 
to the impoverished North that lived under traditional supply-and-demand 
economy (Adesoji, 2011; p. 102).  
 
Yet, this research considers the aspects of identity and its ensuing 
agency. Therefore, I agree with Adesoji (2011; p. 103), who observes the 
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arguments of Hickey (1984), emphasizing the socio-political conception of 
fundamentalist groups. By condemning the secularity of the Nigerian State, 
expressed in the 1979 Constitution, both the Maitatsine and Boko Haram have 
labeled the Nigerian Republic as dagut or taagut, evil and unworthy of the 
cooperation of faithful Muslims. As a result, this could be interpreted beyond the 
economic disparities between the North and the South. Therefore, it is important 
to relate socio-economic information, with the exploration of the construction of 
their religious imagery.  
 
Adesoji (2011) illustrated the predecessor to Boko Haram, and I have 
thus found similarities between both groups, ranging from their emergence to 
their political stances. It is important to highlight a key element that is common 
for both: the underpinning piece of their religious views. Fundamentalism, a 
shared characteristic for Maitatsine and Boko Haram, is the exclusivist stance 
that believes in literal interpretation of sacred writings (Danjibo, 2009; p. 4). It is 
also a microscopic understanding of the same religious teachings (Danjibo, 
2009; p. 4). Furthermore, it has gradually grown in Nigeria since 1980 (Adesoji, 
2011; p. 99). This extremist religious opinion would support Boko Haram’s 
behavior, which contrasts sharply with democracy and secularization. As a 
result, violence and conflict are ignited.  
 
The Maitatsine uprising, from 1980 to 1985, was the first major 
expression of religious extremism in Nigeria (Despoja, 2011; p.100). This 
period, seemingly an omen to Boko Harm, was punctuated with a series of 
violent manifestations in different parts of the country. Arising on 1980 in Kano, 
other demonstrations were soon followed in 1982 in Kaduna, 1984 in Yola, and 
finally 1985 in Bauchi (Adesoji, 2011; p. 101). This conflict preceded Boko 
Haram, but reflects a similar quest to assert an identity. The Nigerian State is 
closely related to both groups as well.  
 
On this matter, Thurston (2016, p. 5) indicates another socio-political 
feature to Boko Haram’s Fundamentalism and the responsibility of the State.  He 
mentions that a chronic persecution to Muslim people in Nigeria, and the 
government’s oppressive response, have sustained the construction of their 
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identity (Thurston, 2016; p. 5). I must, therefore, recall the findings of 
Maiangwa et al. (2012, p 42), who demonstrated the abuse of violence by 
Nigerian security forces with the extrajudicial executions of some of their 
militants in 2009. The brutality exercised by the State only fueled a 
Fundamentalist perspective of condemning governmental corruption.  
 
As per Danjibo (2009), Fundamentalism can be conceptualized on a 
framework of sectarian violence. In addition, I consider the division this author 
marks in Islam: the Shiites and Sunnites. Key differences map their political 
stances, especially regarding the State and the West. For instance, whereas Sunni 
Muslims believe that Islam can be integrated to society and the governments, 
Shiite Muslims believe that Islam must be practiced in its pure and unaltered 
form (Danjibo, 2009; p. 4). The Shiites, moreover, strongly condemn the 
functioning of States as democracies, and label them as satanic (Adesoji, 2010; 
p. 99).  
 
Both sects seem to have influenced Boko Haram. Mohammed Yusuf, its 
former leader, allegedly belonged to the Nigerian Shiites, also known as the 
Islamic Society of Nigeria. Yet, he also left this sect in the end (Adesoji, 2010; 
p. 98-99). It seems likely that Boko Haram’s sentiment of opposition to the 
democratic Nigerian Government was inspired by a Shiite stance, while their 
aim to consolidate an Islamic State ruled under Sharia Law, as well as their 
violent practices, are drawn from Sunni-inspired groups. Furthermore, Onuaha 
(2010, p. 57) believes that the fanatic militants’ ideology is based upon their 
interpretation of Orthodox Islam, dictating that Western values, such as 
education and democracy, should be prohibited.  
 
Although Boko Haram’s name means Western Education is Anathema 
(Onuaha, 2010; p. 57), it is important to note that this is a generalization and 
does not involve all their objectives, nor is it an accurate description for them. 
Boko Haram, for example, has manifested that they actually oppose Western 
Society as a whole, preaching the superiority of Islam (Onuaha, 2010; p. 57), an 
echo of what Maitatsine proclaimed. According to one of its members, their 
mission is to clean the Nigerian State from Western education and the vices that 
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have stained it (Onuaha, 2010; p. 57). Their exclusivism is founded on a 
Fundamentalist perspective, condemning everything outside their perception. 
For instance, non-members, as stated by Onuaha (2010; p. 57), are considered 
kuffar, or disbelievers, and fasiqun, or wrongdoers. 
 
The religious exclusivism of Boko Haram is advanced by yet another 
conservative attitude on Islam. According to Thurston (2016, p. 9), Boko Haram 
declared themselves as a Salafi group, meaning that they abide by the early 
teachings of their religion, applying literal interpretation to sacred books as 
manuals to everyday life. Nevertheless, Salafists are a minority even in northern 
Nigeria (Thurston, 2016; p. 9), and they have denounced Boko Haram’s 
violence. In fact, as for 2016, Salafist leaders declared their opposition to them 
(Thurston, 2016; p. 10). Yet, they also provide a mapping on the interpretation 
of Boko Haram’s religious arguments.  
 
Nigerian Salafism appeared with Abubakar Gumi, a law student that 
concluded that traditional Muslim scholars did not properly understand Islam. 
He opposed the mystic Islamic tradition of Sufism, and, in 1978, his followers 
founded Jama’at Izalat al-Bid’a wa-Iqamat al-Sunna (The Society for the 
Removal of Heretical Innovation and the Prophet’s Model), a group known as 
Izala. After Gumi’s death, Izala found itself divided. Consequently, some of its 
leaders, who gloried in having studied abroad in Saudi Arabia, commenced to 
recruit young preachers (Thurston, 2016; p. 10).  
 
 Thus, Mohammed Yusuf, future founder of Boko Haram, enrolled 
himself with the Salafists (Thurston, 2016; p. 10). From them, he learned their 
perspectives on literal and conservative interpretation of Islam. Moreover, Yusuf 
followed the teachings of today’s Salafi-jihadi theorists, such as Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi. In fact, from him he learned the idea of al-wala’ wa-l-
bara’, which translates to loyalty to those considered true Muslims and 
disavowal from all others (Thurston, 2016; p. 12).  
 
It is under these circumstances that Boko Haram declared abiding by a 
Salafist stance. And, although Salafists have distanced themselves from the 
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aforementioned extremist group, Thurston (2016, p. 10) states that they are 
closely related. Moreover, he believes that the materialization of Boko Haram 
must not be seen as an offspring to Izala, but rather as a result of inner 
competition for devotees (Thurston, 2016; p. 10), alongside economic and social 
elements in a divided country. The breach between both Northern and Southern 
states, existing since Maitatsine, further accentuated religious extremism in 
Boko Haram’s identity.  
 
For instance, the following image exemplifies the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria divided into North and South, and the legal adoption of Sharia Law:  
 
IMAGE No. 1 
Map of Nigerian States that have adopted the Sharia Law 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 Source: CSM Nigeria, 2016 
 Produced by: CSM Nigeria 
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As it was stated above, the Republic of Nigeria is a Secular State, yet it 
allows the existence of Islamic Law (The Commonwealth, 2017). Likewise, it is 
important to draw a connection between this map and the data on casualties due 
to Boko Haram, gathered from ACLED (2015). Northern states, especially 
Borno, are the main areas of influence for Boko Haram. According to Adesoji 
(2011), the existence of religious fanatic groups is explained by economic, social 
and political reasoning.  
 
In 1999, after 33 years of failed democratic periods intertwined with 
dictatorships, the transition seemed difficult to align with Islamic tradition. 
Northern governors applied the Sharia Law in their provinces as a way to assure 
locals that they would remain true to the moral foundations conceived in Islam, 
in contrast to the supposedly corrupted South (Thurston, 2016; p. 11). 
Correspondingly, twelve northern states implemented the Sharia in criminal law 
(Kenhammer, 2013; p. 292). This resulted in a dual legal system and a state 
religion, although this was not contemplated in the Constitution (Adesoji, 2011; 
p. 110).  
 
Part II, 
Powers of the Federal Republic of Nigeria:  
(…) 
10. Prohibition of State Religion.   
(…) 
(The Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999) 
 
On September 19 of the same year, a resulting movement started with 
Ahmed Sani Yerima, governor of the Zamfara state. As part of his political 
campaign, Yerima proposed to implement Sharia Law once elected. This, in fact 
was the discourse for the All People’s Party, the opposition to the Government 
(Kenhammer, 2013; p. 293). Kenhammer (2013; p. 293) argues that the proposal 
was a strategy to gain legitimacy from Muslim voters, as they believed that the 
imposition of secularity lowered them to second-class citizens (Adesoji, 2011; p. 
111). This was stressed by their perception of a tyrannical government (Adesoji, 
2011; p. 111). 
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Meanwhile, Yusuf inspired a fundamentalist rhetoric in Borno. He stated 
that Sharia law alone might not save Muslims from moral corruption, but rather 
a whole Islamic System (Thurston, 2016; p. 11). This discourse, based on the 
collection of arguments of both Sunni and Shiite sects against the Nigerian State, 
and following a Salafist perspective on Islam, was the foundation of Boko 
Haram’s religious stance, and their perception of women. Although not yet 
explained, it is important to consider the elements that start forming Boko 
Haram’s masculine identity, or rather, their idea of hegemonic masculinity. As 
will be seen later, this is related to what their militants believe as an ideal man.   
 
Thus, Yusuf illustrated devotion while abiding by Islamic customs, and 
disloyalty by following Western values, such as its model on Education 
(Thurston, 2016; p. 12). Yusuf also believed in izhar al-din, or the way one may 
express its faith through public action, coupling this belief with a condemnation 
of following teachings other than Allah’s (al-hukm bi-ghayr ma anzala Allah) 
(Thurston, 2016; p. 12). This is a clear reference to Western values, which from 
this point onward will be unacceptable to Boko Haram. As per Thurston (2016; 
p. 12-13), Yusuf’s, and consequently Boko Haram’s success is due to what the 
author named the fragmentation of cared authority: after colonial rule, and 
subsequent independence, Islamic leaders known as emirs maintained their 
status in the North. However, for Yusuf, they were corrupted and failed in their 
mission of maintaining their religion (Thurston, 2016; p. 13).  
 
After Yusuf’s death in 2009, Abubakar Shekau assumed Boko Haram’s 
leadership. As his successor, he also had an unyielding stance between Islam and 
democracy. And, although Shekau’s direction is not deemed as religious as 
Yusuf’s, he uses Salifi rhetoric to justify the slaughter of civilians, the assaults 
on those who abide by Western values of democracy and education, and the 
bombing attacks on public institutions (Thurston, 2016; p. 14). The former 
leader ingrained the identity of Boko Haram with a rigid fundamentalist 
perception that would resonate and guide the actions of the fanatic militants on 
the day they abducted the Chibok girls.  
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Yet, on the changing leadership of Boko Haram, I also considered 
Thurston (2016; p. 6), who believes that the religious narrative may not be 
representative of the group as a whole, but is used, nonetheless, as a way to 
justify their violence. Therefore, the alleged theological and political stance of 
Boko Haram consists in both an opposition to a value system other than their 
interpretation of Islam, and their politics of victimhood. The former states a 
religious exclusivism that shuns away from behaviors deemed divergent from 
Islam, such as Western education, democracy, constitutionalism and pacific 
coexistence with other faiths (Thurston, 2016; p. 5). The case that would be 
developed in this dissertation is the abduction of the Chibok girls, fully 
addressed in the third chapter.  
 
Thus, following the studies of Onuaha (2010), Adesoji (2011), and 
Thurston (2016), I can presume Boko Haram is the byproduct of a changing 
society that involves both fundamentalism and globalization within their 
territory. Moved by an opposition towards the West, which is also triggered by 
Islamophobia and the War on Terror, Boko Haram relied on violence to assert 
their identity. Moreover, its founder, Muhammad Yusuf, constructed Boko 
Haram’s religious stance based on different currents of conservative Islam. For 
instance, he supported his vision with both Sunni and Shiite arguments against a 
democratic state, and furthered a fundamentalist perspective by considering 
Salafists teachings on literal interpretation of the Quran. Consequently, this led 
to a religious exclusivist identity, which condemned any dissident attitude 
against this group.   
 
In conclusion, bearing in mind that the specific objective for this chapter 
was to analyze the context that lead to the emergence of Boko Haram, it was 
found that this group is influenced by different factors, ranging from the 
international context, to local history. The Structure that triggered their violent 
agency is marked, on a Global level, by opposing notions of both Globalization 
and Fundamentalism. The former, a historic process that is influenced by 
Western perspectives of secularity, is conceptualized in both capitalism and 
democracy. The latter is triggered as a reactionary force to the loss of religious 
identity. Moreover, the War on Terror and Islamophobia, both outcomes of the 
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9/11 attacks on the United States, fuel anti-West sentiments that serve as a 
platform for groups like Boko Haram. Furthermore, on a local level, Boko 
Haram is considered the outcome of political, religious and economic tensions in 
Nigeria. Impoverished Northern states, where Government’s protection is 
absent, rely on conservative religious views and sustain extremist militias. The 
militants’ claim of corruption from the Government is further fueled by State 
repression and extrajudicial killings, encouraging a hateful discourse against the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria. Yet, these arguments that attempt to explain the 
group’s existence must also take into account an exploration of their religious 
views. Following their founder’s lead, Mohammed Yusuf, Boko Haram relies on 
both Sunni and Shiite arguments against the democratic Nigerian State, wishing 
to implement a fully Islamic system. In addition, their character is constructed 
around a Salafist stance that dictates literal and orthodox interpretations to Islam. 
Thus, Boko Haram’s identity was explored in political and social perspectives. 
Nevertheless, it lacks an important element that would describe the group’s 
behavior toward women: their masculine ideal.  
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2. CHAPTER II: MASCULINITIES CRISIS AND VIOLENCE 
 
There is no single way to be a man; no true consensus on how to define 
masculinity. Yet, society would like to think otherwise, relying on violence to 
assert, or rather, to impose on men an unyielding character. Masculinity, as a 
social construction, defines itself in opposition to femininity and women. 
Therefore, once the power relations that sustain these notions are contested, men 
are left with no gender individuality. Boko Haram, as was noted above, bases its 
identity on fundamentalism and on opposition to the Nigerian State. Moreover, 
the Chibok schoolgirls abduction reveals a new element: that of an alleged 
frustration of gender constructions. Yet, this subject encompasses a wide range 
of theories that attempt to explore the root causes that triggers this phenomenon. 
For this reason, this chapter’s specific objective is to study the existence of a 
crisis of Masculinities caused by women empowerment through education.  
 
Moreover, this theoretical discussion contemplates feminist perspectives 
on different concepts, ranging from women’s agency to gender-based violence. 
Following a postcolonial feminist methodology, I take into account both 
Western and local academic production to explore the subject of analysis, 
avoiding ill-fitting generalizations. Further, this will be accompanied with 
ethnographic and qualitative studies on the experiences of Nigerians regarding 
gender constructions. To that end, the first idea considered in this chapter refers 
to the existing hierarchy on the plurality of Masculinities: the Hegemonic 
Masculinity. This part will attempt to acknowledge the way Patriarchy presents 
itself in this country, while influencing the ideal masculinity for Boko Haram. 
This concept will be combined with that of women’s empowerment through 
education, conceived under the United Nations’ perspective. Next, I analyze the 
crisis of Masculinities, a reactionary force that responds to the contestation of 
men’s identity, which is related to the empowerment of minorities. Finally, I will 
reflect on how the aforementioned dilemma may result in gender-based 
violence, as male privilege is contested and an unstable identity feels threatened.  
 
Concerning Hegemonic Masculinity and Boko Haram, I mostly refer to 
Raewyn Connell’s (2000-2014) works, as this author examines the hierarchy and 
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plurality of Masculinities. Nevertheless, Postcolonial and African Feminism are 
also contemplated, so as to render Connell’s theory relevant to the Nigerian 
perspective. Furthermore, it is important to mention the struggling nature of the 
masculine ideal, as different forms of it compete to position themselves among 
new threats and challenges in a patriarchal system. Likewise, an African gender 
outlook involves an inclusive stance towards men, while bearing in mind a post-
colonial methodology that avoids generalizations concerning the subjects of 
study.  
 
Kabeer’s (2005) findings on empowerment, on the other hand, illustrate a 
new concept that is alien to Masculinities. Nevertheless, it is intertwined with 
the violence expressed by the Hegemonic ideal Connell mentioned. Following 
the Millennium Development Goals’ perspective, empowerment must be both 
transformative and active. On this account, it would grant women positive 
Agency to regain the power that was taken from them. Moreover, Lemon’s 
(1995) work suggests that men that do not adapt to these changing power 
relations will experiment a Masculinities crisis, especially if minorities position 
themselves on traditionally men-held spheres. This, alongside a historic and 
ethnographic discussion from Uchendu (2007) and local NGOs will allow us to 
create an image of gender constructions in Nigeria.   
 
Understanding Masculinities crisis entails taking into consideration 
gender-based violence. Given, for instance, that men feel frustrated with their 
identity and loss of authority over women, violent reactions seem to be a 
consequence to this phenomenon. Therefore, the works of Kaufman (1999) 
explain how Manhood Acts towards women are a way to assert the power that 
has been objected. Likewise, the author also explains the relation to male 
privilege as the cause of this brutal behavior. In this part of the chapter, the final 
piece of theoretical analysis refers to how violence is constructed around men 
and gender. Before exploring on the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls, I must 
first lay the foundations for the analysis of its identity as masculine, and 
patriarchal, beings.   
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2.1. The Construction of the Masculine Ideal in Nigeria, According to Boko 
Haram 
 
Boko Haram has declared its hostility to democracy and secularization, 
as both elements undermine part of its identity. Yet, to complete this analysis, I 
must also consider what this group fathoms as the definition of being a man. 
This will involve, for instance, reflecting on gender constructions in Nigeria, and 
their underpinning elements, such as power and authority. Accordingly, 
Masculinities Theory can interpret the way a Hegemonic Masculinity is imposed 
on Nigerian men, while at the same time being perpetuated by Boko Haram. 
And, although this dissertation considers Western academic production, it is 
used, as Mohanty (1988, p. 338) would state, to understand this dilemma rather 
than to explain it.  
 
The starting point for this discussion will be an overview of African 
Feminism, for it sustains this dissertation analysis. Appropriately, this 
exploration will delve in post-colonialism, as it is a concept closely related to 
African perspectives on gender equality. For instance, this trend proposes a way 
to rethink theory form the Global South, to include ignored perspectives that are 
closer to the problem itself. This unequal scholastic participation of African men 
and women, according to Lloyd Brown, is owed to their studies not being 
written in European languages (da Silva, 2004, p. 129). As per da Silva (2004; p. 
129), for example, Western Academia has left behind the voices of black 
women, while imposing irrelevant solutions to their problems. Similarly, Carole 
Boyce Davis evidenced the oppression suffered by African women, composed 
by racist colonialism and the construction of a rule over the indigenous peoples 
by foreigners (da Silva, 2004; p. 130).  
 
In regard to post-colonialist Feminism, Mohanty (1988, p. 335) states 
that the West has sustained a hegemonic scholar production, affecting and 
influencing the studies of developing countries. Her criticism does not ignore the 
work of different Western women on Feminism; rather, it seeks to hear different 
voices. Therefore, the author (1988, p. 336-335) contemplates three main 
arguments against Western academia, especially regarding gender equality 
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production. Firstly, she denounces the construction of the category of women as 
a coherent, universal, group with the same interests and aims and with no 
attention to their economic and ethnic background. Secondly, she rejects the 
Universalist stance on methodology to comprehend women, used cross-
culturally. Thirdly, she criticizes the assumption of the same political model of 
power applied to different countries. 
 
To avoid Western academia limitations, women should not be 
contemplated as a coherent group of analysis, as it would reduce them to 
material subjects and victims of subjugation (Mohanty, 1988; p. 338). Western 
feminist discourse, for example, emphasizes the existence of women oppression 
as a universal occurrence, instead of attempting to understand the reasons behind 
a given specific circumstance of violence (Mohanty, 1988; p. 338). 
Homogenizing women, and men, as a consistent category further ignores historic 
processes with incongruent assumptions (Mohanty, 1988; p. 344). Therefore, 
this dissertation will not use Connell’s Masculinities Theory, as a generalizing 
explanation to Boko Haram. Rather, it will focus on the exploration of its 
identity and its relation to education. 
 
Moreover, it must be noted that as per Mohanty (1988, p. 347-348), 
methodologies that assume concepts and ideas coming from the West to be 
applied regardless of a country’s historical process are deemed as imperialistic. 
This is the reason why I initially regarded the historic evolution of Boko Haram, 
and its relation to the international context. In addition, this chapter will include 
ethnographic information related to the Nigerian gender imagery, so as to 
include local perspectives and avoid suppositions.  
 
Power relations, seen from a Western perspective, tend to victimize 
women as powerless objects, without considering their context and furthering a 
paternalistic point of view (Mohanty, 1988; p. 351-353). I must stress the 
explorative nature of my work, as I refer to the research of a specific event. 
Consequently, the Chibok schoolgirls’ abduction cannot be considered a broad 
example of women’s experiences in this country. To illustrate this argument, the 
International Crisis Group (2016, p. 20) believes that, although women in North-
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eastern Nigeria suffer from patriarchal violence, their interaction with Boko 
Haram should not be generalized as victims to the extremist group, as many 
women participate within it and perpetuate exploitation.  
 
In addition, Connell (2014; p. 1-6) argues that feminist theory has 
experienced an economy of knowledge, where theory produced from the Global 
North is preferred rather than that coming from the South. To address the 
patriarchal dimensions of inequality, Feminism needs a world scale, a mosaic 
framework that integrates theory from the South and the North (Connell, 2014; 
p. 14). To illustrate, the author (2014; p. 5) affirms that scholars on Feminism 
have advanced on a colonization of gender, rather than its globalization. Thus, 
she (2014; p. 13) encourages a world-centered perspective on gender and 
Masculinities, with a post-colonial stance that considers hegemony.  
 
As a result, southern theorizing involves a critical appropriation of 
Northern Theory, combined with proper empirical knowledge (Connell, 2014; p. 
7). Following a historic account of Boko Haram, I stress this stance as I use 
different perspectives on Feminism, originating from diverse countries and 
backgrounds, to investigate Boko Haram as a subject of analysis. At the same 
time, I avoid generalizing women as victims and oppressed objects of research. 
Thus, this is the post-colonial view that has sustained this dissertation. 
 
Postcolonial Feminism includes local perspectives in research, and 
denounces a paternalistic view on the experiences of women in other countries. 
On that account, I must also base my explorative research on African Feminism. 
As evidenced by Essof (2001, pg. 124), this type of theory must be reviewed in 
all of its schools of thought. Addressed by the Nigerian writer Amina Mama, 
these concern with different perspectives on gender equality. The first one states 
that it is a bourgeois Western invention and that it lacks meaning for African 
women in general. On the other hand, the second one recognizes the importance 
of feminism, but inquires a name change. Examples of this stance are the 
womanists or the Islamic feminists (Essof, 2001, pg. 124). The third school of 
thought, according to Mama, suggests seizing the concept of feminism through 
the experiences of African women (Essof 2001, pg. 125).  
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Moreover, African feminists, according to Phanuel Egejuru ad Ketu 
Ketrak, believe that it is important not to segregate men from the reconstruction 
of the continent (da Silva, 2004, p. 135). To illustrate this point, let us recall da 
Silva’s (2004, p. 135) words on this theory, as the author stressed that it would 
seek justice for all people. On a local level, Nigerian Feminists have criticized a 
unitary, patriarchal-oriented, vision of religion, culture or tradition, as these 
terms are subject to interpretation (Pereira, 2009; p. 265). For example, Pereira 
(2009, p. 266) states that Nigerian conflicts relate to competing groups of men, 
while being dependent on their degree of militarism. In fact, the author (2009, p. 
266) considers that masculinities are expressed in different spheres of society 
aside from violent power. On this regard, she contemplates culture, religion, and 
politics, concluding that women’s bodies are bound to represent a moral order 
(Pereira, 2009; p. 267). 
 
Thus, for this Bachelor Dissertation, I will rely on the third school of 
thought of African Feminism. As stated above, Nigerian Feminists on this stance 
believe in a critical appropriation of Northern theory, following Connell’s 
(2014) terms. This would allow the comparison and contrast of the works of 
Connell’s (2000-2014) Masculinities Theory, while emphasizing Nigerian 
perspectives concerning gender constructions, Boko Haram, and their regard on 
violence. In addition, Nigerian Feminism also focuses on the study of men and 
their identity. As per Pereira (2009), power structures concerning the body of 
Nigerian women in relation to men is also part of the studies on African 
Feminism. Therefore, this will sustain the exploration of masculinity as a gender 
construction.  
 
I will refer to a different context and consider postcolonial perspectives 
on masculinity. Therefore, I must explore the construction of gender in relation 
to Patriarchy, male privilege, women and femininity. For instance, I will reflect 
on the work of Bharucha (1995), who provides starting remarks concerning the 
irreconcilability of men and the Feminist theory. According to this author (1995, 
pg. 1610), some men opposing feminism could be, in fact, detractors of 
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Patriarchy. Yet, they would not acknowledge that instead of criticizing the 
system, they are actually against their ideas of masculinity.  
 
Bharucha (1995, pg. 1610) also argues that the terms man, masculine and 
manly are not quite classified and defined. This is in accordance to Mohanty’s 
(1988) arguments of avoiding a generalization of theory imposed to the Global 
South. The author then states that someone that was born a man, or someone that 
is masculine, is not necessarily due to their sex. Therefore, he ventures with a 
provisional definition for masculinity, taking distance from the traditional sense 
as a natural and inherent characteristic for men. He defines it as a social and 
political construction that is later developed through patriarchic interventions 
(Bharucha, 1995; pg. 1610). This coincides with Connell’s Masculinities theory, 
referring to her studies on hierarchy: the author considers that some historic 
moments and circumstances of power consolidation define what it is to be a 
man, an idea that would be furthered by popular consent (Bharucha, 1995, pg. 
1610).  
 
Once having established a postcolonial perspective on men gender 
constructions from a Global South, I will now focus on Connell’s studies of the 
plurality of masculinity. As there are diverse forms of being a man, it must be 
noted that all these identities are subject of an unattainable ideal for men and 
young boys. Hegemonic Masculinity, thus, is a concept developed in regard to 
the gay liberation movement of the seventies, through their understanding of 
men suffering in a Patriarchal society (Connell, 2015; p. 2-3). This idea was 
further defined as the set of practices that accentuated men dominance over 
women (Connell, 2015; p. 3).  
 
Although, in theory, a minority of men around the globe may enact their 
local vision of Hegemonic Masculinity, this is still a normative feature in gender 
relations (Connell, 2005; p. 3). This concept shrines the most valued 
characteristics of being a man, illustrated as an unachievable goal to fulfill 
(Connell, 2005; p. 3). Additionally, men that still perceive patriarchal benefits 
from this concept show complicit masculinity (Connell, 2005; p. 3) that will 
accentuate their relation towards dominance and gender inequality. 
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Nevertheless, I must stress that the above-mentioned concept of 
Hegemonic Masculinity is not identical in every society. Indeed, Patriarchal 
hierarchies are subject to historical change, with some forms of masculinity 
being replaced by new ones (Connell, 2005; p. 3), all in an enduring struggle to 
assert a certain type of ideal upon other. Moreover, Connell (2005; p. 7) 
confirms that these diverse Masculinities are bound to change, in regard to their 
current concept of hegemony. Therefore, Masculinities are the diverse forms of 
being a man in each country (Connell, 2005; p.  6). As with the Nigerian case, 
this gender construction must be contrasted to its historical process and in 
relation to culture and religion. For instance, elements that would dictate Boko 
Haram’s gender perspective might be influenced by Nigerian’s colonial past, its 
current politics and their fundamentalist vision.  
 
Connell (2015; p. 22) also suggest a new framework to understand 
Hegemonic Masculinity. The local level, which refers to relations within 
families and communities, is the base of the construction of a gender hegemony. 
Moreover, the regional level involves cultural and nation-state aspects that 
would affect a country as a whole. Finally, the global level considers the world 
stage, and exemplifies the imposition of a masculine ideal upon different 
countries and cultures. These different degrees of analysis provide diverse 
insights to the construction of men’s identity. As a result, I will focus on the 
regional level of a masculine ideal, as it involves the Federal Nigerian Republic 
in contrast to Boko Haram’s fundamentalist perspective. This research, 
consequently, explores the concept of masculinities in relation to women 
empowerment. Therefore, I follow Connell’s (2005, p. 24) argument on 
Hegemonic Masculinity, as she states that it is subject to be challenged in a 
scenario that rendered it obsolete (Connell, 2005; p. 24). 
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CHART No. 2 
Summary of the main theories used in this Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: Mohanty (1988), Connell (2005; 2014) Essof (2001), Bharucha (1995), 
da Silva (2004), Pereira (2009) 
 Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
 
To complement the theoretical discussion started above, I use Chart No. 
2. This bachelor dissertation will sustain its analysis on both perspectives: 
Postcolonial and African Feminism, as the research basis to understand gender 
construction in Nigeria, and more importantly, under Boko Haram. Post-
colonialism, for instance, provides a local framework on critical perspectives for 
Masculinities Theory, further illustrating Nigerian experiences in regard to Men 
Studies. Moreover, it is used to explore the subjects rather than to provide 
simplistic explanations of its existence. African Feminism, and more 
specifically, Nigerian Feminism, clarify the patriarchal obstacles Nigerian 
Women face, as contrasted with a generalization of their struggle. Furthermore, 
Masculinities theory, considerably influenced on a postcolonial perspective, 
states the changing nature of Hegemonic Masculinity as dependent on local 
historical processes and culture. Only by critically appropriating these ideas, 
will we be able to understand Boko Haram’s gender construction.  
 
Once having defined the theoretical support for my research, I will 
address the elements of fundamentalism that accentuated the construction of 
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Masculinity with reference to Boko Haram. Nevertheless, concerning religious 
gender ideas is a broad subject, and, following a postcolonial perspective, one 
should avoid assumptions and suppositions that reduce the exploration of these 
elements. To illustrate, according to Muslim feminists, the Quran does not depict 
a singular type of masculinity (De Sondy, 2013; p. 13). Therefore, to map the 
elements the Nigerian extremists used to establish their identity, we should delve 
on their misunderstandings in regard to gender norms. 
 
Thereby, according to one of Prophet Muhammad’s hadiths, i.e. 
tradition, pious men in Islam must cultivate a valiant spirit and heroic devotion 
to Allah (De Sondy, 2013; p. 10). Notwithstanding, he does not mention 
marriage, procreation or family, all of these important elements to Muslim men 
(De Sondy, 2013; p. 10). Furthermore, De Sondy (2013, p. 10) states that a 
masculinity inspired by the Quran is a subjective idea that depends on the person 
defending this concept. Mainly, it serves an individual’s interests. The author 
(2013; p. 9) also argues that the construction of this identity shapes the 
understanding of Islam. These could be further discussed as elements of a 
misleading perspective on the conception of gender and religion. By way of 
illustration, the Hegemonic values mentioned above respond to specific interest 
of a group of people. And, as with Fundamentalism, they reflect a political 
agenda. 
 
As per Hopkins (2006; p. 337), there are two main masculinities 
discourses in Muslim youth. One emphasizes manliness and patriarchal values, 
while the other stresses the allegedly feminine behavior of studying. The author 
states that the latter is recurrent in Muslim environments in Western societies, 
where he conducted his research. Hopkins (2006; p. 340) also finds that Muslim 
young boys consider the house as a feminine territory, associating it with 
housekeeping. This is a construction that has been rooted in the identity of 
Muslim youth and men. Moreover, the author’s conclusions provide us a first 
illustration to the Hegemonic Masculinity conception of Boko Haram, based 
upon binary gender norms and the relegation of women to a specific private 
sphere. I agree with Hopkins (2006, p. 341), who believes that Patriarchy 
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originates from culture, rather than religion. Once again, this dissertation will 
not address Islam, only fundamentalist extremism. 
 
To illustrate this point, we would regard the case of Syed Abdul Ala 
Mawdudi, a political figure of post-imperial India, as he succeeded shaping a 
binary conception for fundamentalist Masculinity. Namely, his work defined 
men by opposing them against three other ideas: God, the West and women in 
general (De Sondy, 2013; p. 12). Although one of his teachings, found in the 
book Purdah, presented the ideal Muslim woman, he also created the vision for 
an ideal Muslim man following a dualistic gender perspective. Afterwards, his 
stance has resonated throughout other Muslim leaders in other countries (De 
Sondy, 2013; p. 17-18) particularly in fundamentalist backgrounds that agree 
with Mawdudi’s definition of manliness.  
 
Consequently, Muslim feminists have highlighted the importance of 
breaking the binary construction of Muslim men and God, Muslim men and the 
West, and Muslim men and women (De Sondy, 2013; p. 12). Therefore, the 
definition of Masculinity must be constructed in opposition to an antagonistic 
idea. As a result of a dualistic society, femininity would be the opponent of 
masculinity (De Sondy, 2013; p. 11). This, thus, has paved a Mawdudi-inspired 
logic that sustains Boko Haram’s worldview.  
 
For example, the relation Mawdudi explores in regard to God is also 
expressed in the Nigerian fundamentalist militia. As Walker (2012; p. 4) already 
mentioned, the separation of this group from the mainstream Islam in Nigeria, 
calling it corrupted beyond repair, exemplifies how their masculinity is 
constructed in regard to religion. Additionally, recalling Boko Haram’s 
opposition to Western influence in the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Maiangwa 
et al., 2012; p. 45) would be in the accordance to Mawdudi’s arguments. 
Following his ideas of hostility towards the West, the extremists would 
accentuate their manliness. The final element on a Mawdudi-inspired approach 
would be the opposition to women and femininity, an argument that can be 
illustrated with the abductions of the Chibok schoolgirls.  
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Following Mawdudi’s idea of masculinity, Boko Haram has asserted its 
identity in opposition to three other ideas. Yet, it is important to complete this 
analysis with a study on fundamentalism and gender. As it was noted above, 
religious extremism was already addressed in its historical and political 
perspectives. Now, I will emphasize the work of Ahmed (2006) as it elaborates 
on fundamentalist gender norms and constructions. He starts this discussion by 
dividing fundamentalism in both high and low. The former stance is espoused by 
educated individuals that abide by a narrow interpretation of Islam. The latter 
expresses another scenario regarding illiteracy a religious extremism. Both types 
of this attitude are repressive towards women (Ahmed, 2006; p. 11), and 
according to Ahmed’s division, Boko Haram would align to low 
Fundamentalism.  
 
To further illustrate his arguments on gender construction and 
Masculinities, Ahmed (2006; p. 21) exemplifies them with the Taliban 
fundamentalism in Pakistan. The author argues that the notion of being a man is 
more related to advancing patriarchal agendas, rather than following the 
teachings of Islam. The same would be true in Nigeria, with the aims of Boko 
Haram, as they seek power and dominance, both qualities of a masculine 
construction. As for other religious extremist groups, Masculinity is related to 
aggression, violence and power (Ahmed, 2006; p. 21).  
 
In addition, other characteristic that would apply to Boko Harm and 
fundamentalist masculinities is further addressed by Ahmed (2006; p. 24): youth 
that flank the ranks of Islamic extremists are forced to accept fundamentalist 
concepts as a consequence to poverty, while being sent to religious schools in 
haste to counter globalization and their fading cultural existence (Ahmed, 2006; 
p. 25). This would be related to Boko Haram’s opposition to the West, especially 
concerning democracy and secularization.  
 
Accordingly, the elements that have been analyzed can provide a 
framework to define Boko Haram’s gender construction. Nevertheless, it is 
important to highlight the diversity of masculinities that Connell addressed, 
bearing in mind that every country and community is exposed to a different ideal 
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of Masculinity. Therefore, Hegemonic Masculinity, being subject to a historical 
process, might be contested by another ideal that wishes to overthrow it in its 
hierarchy. Regarding the Nigerian extremists, they have claimed that their 
country is infected by Western values, like democracy. For instance, as was 
noted in the first chapter, a conflict of identity related to their stances concerning 
secularization and political corruption points to a struggling Masculinities 
scenario, where traditional values of manliness are replaced by western-style 
perspectives that oppose their customs. This would be the outcome of the 
conception of the Southern Nigerian States, following the adoption of secularity 
in the Republic. Boko Haram, therefore, would seek to assert its idea of 
Hegemonic Masculinity over the Nigerian community. 
 
De Sondy (2013) also illustrated that a Mawdudi-inspired worldview is 
based upon a dichotomy perspective. In particular, the conception of this 
orthodox Islamic political persona defines Masculinity by opposing it against the 
meaning of the West, God and Women. The discussion above already addressed 
the antagonism Boko Haram expressed towards the West. Now, following the 
contradiction of Masculinity and Femininity, it is important to mention the base 
of this group’s actions. For instance, its discourse undermines the constitutional 
rights of women and homosexuals (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 46). Regarding 
God, one should remember that Boko Haram, as a Salafi group, has deviated 
from mainstream Islam, labeling it as corrupted. 
 
In conclusion, Boko Haram is deemed to position their idea of 
Hegemonic Masculinity that has been casted aside by a new democratic and 
western-influenced identity in Nigeria. This is further illustrated by their way of 
defining what it is to be a man in opposition to different concepts. For instance, 
they stress their masculinity by defining it with a fundamentalist perspective. 
Likewise, they oppose Western values, as a way to assert their Hegemonic 
Masculinity. Thus, their relation to women that are outside their understanding 
of gender norms may elicit conflict resulting, for example, in the abduction of 
the Chibok Girls; in a crisis of Masculinities.  
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2.2. The Masculinities Crisis as a Result to Women Empowerment  
 
As was noted above, Boko Haram seemingly wishes to perpetuate their 
idea on Hegemonic Masculinity, using fundamentalism as means to further 
patriarchal and political agendas. A phenomenon that Connell (2005) already 
envisioned, as this unyielding gender construction is subject to be challenged 
and contested. Yet, the consequences of this conflict were not addressed in the 
previous paragraphs. Therefore, this part of the second chapter will contemplate 
the ensuing effects of opposing toxic notions of men’s identity. Known as 
Masculinities Crisis, these reactions are connected to women and, as it would be 
seen, equality. Thus, I shall begin the present discussion by firstly referring to 
empowerment as a concept. This would be followed by the relation between men 
and women in the African, and more specifically, Nigerian scenario. Finally, the 
resulting findings of these studies will be applied in the Boko Haram case.  
 
On a first remark regarding empowerment, it is important to mention that 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948, serves as a basis for its 
discourse. For instance, Connell (2015, p. 1) accentuates that this has settled 
equality between men and women as a recognized element in International Law. 
Nevertheless, this idea may be criticized as a Western-oriented definition, 
especially under Boko Haram’s perspective. On this matter, it is important to 
mention that although the Beijing Declaration of 1995 consider education as a 
women’s right, for the purpose of this research, the following arguments will be 
aligned to the Empowerment definition according to the United Nations’ 
Millennium Development Goals, as it exemplifies current State commitments 
and actions: 
 
Goal 3: Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women  
Target 3.A: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably 
by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015 
(United Nations, 2000) 
 
Following this line of thought, I contemplate Kabeer’s (2005) 
perspectives on Empowerment and Education, both concepts that will be 
essential to analyze the Chibok School abduction. The author’s observations 
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begin by firstly defining Disempowerment. She conceives it as the given status 
of a specific group of people who initially possessed power and had it taken 
from them, especially regarding decision-making (Kabeer, 2005; p. 13-14). 
Moreover, as Disempowerment mainly entails the lack of possibilities to choose 
from (Kabeer, 2005; p. 14), individuals become dependent on other people to 
decide for them.  
 
Disempowered women, for example, will be continually controlled given 
the absence of other opportunities. Nevertheless, possibilities to challenge this 
structure, aside from being extant, must also be visible (Kabeer, 2005; p. 14). 
According to Kabeer (2005, p. 14), not all choices are considered pertinent for 
empowerment. These must be strategic and vital for one’s life, such as freedom 
to pursue education. Otherwise, interiorized power relations of subjugation will 
result in a cycle of powerlessness. Empowerment consequently refers to the 
contestation of this condition, while regaining the ability to decide over one’s 
affairs (Kabeer, 2005; p. 13-14).  
 
In accordance to Kabeer’s (2005) perspectives, this analysis eventually 
relates to the aspect of Agency as the process followed to determine over 
changing possibilities, in contestation to a disempowered structure (Kabeer, 
2005; p. 14). On this regard, the author notes that the outcomes of this concept 
depend on the individual. Hence, Agency may be seen as positive, such as the 
power to decide over one’s life; and negative, as power over someone as a figure 
of authority (Kabeer, 2005; p. 14). Empowerment, therefore, requires a positive 
force capable of contesting existing power relations that subjugate one’s will 
(Kabeer, 2005; p. 14), while accentuating self-worth (Kabeer, 2005; p. 15).  
 
Furthermore, Empowerment relates to an active Agency, which dictates 
the will to act against the established power relations (Kabeer, 2005; p. 15). It 
also requires transformative Agency that challenges patriarchal structures 
(Kabeer, 2005; p. 16). To illustrate this point, Kabeer (2005, p.16) stresses 
Education, as it encourages women to think about their own wellbeing, as well 
as that of their families, and it may challenge existing structures (Kabeer, 2005; 
p. 16). Nonetheless, Education, to be truly empowering, must be transformative. 
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If not, Patriarchal societies could use it as means of indoctrination that teaches 
women to perpetuate traditional gender roles (Kabeer, 2005; p. 17). Therefore, 
women’s empowerment through education should question power constructions 
(Kabeer, 2005; p. 17).  
 
Kabeer (2005, p. 15) also considers other elements that constitute 
Empowerment, aside from Agency, being Resources and Achievements. On this 
regard, Resources relate to the tools needed to attain it (Kabeer, 2005; p. 15). 
Recalling the alleged disempowered status of an individual, the author stresses 
that Positive Agency, i.e. power over one’s life, is undermined if it depends on 
someone else (Kabeer, 2005; p. 15). Education, therefore, illustrates a new way 
to challenge this status quo, especially the resource of information. She 
concludes her observations on Empowerment by analyzing Achievements 
(Kabeer, 2005; p. 15). This element involves the outcomes of agency and 
resources, given free will and a contestation of power structures (Kabeer, 2005; 
p. 15), and being its ultimate objective to de-construct the status quo. 
 
Hence, for the purpose of this Dissertation, the perspective on Women 
Empowerment follows the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals, 
emphasizing girls’ education as a way to encourage gender equality. Moreover, 
as summarized by Chart No. 3, I also consider the Kabeer’s (2005) criticism to 
this stance to further implement Empowerment as a contestation force to 
Patriarchy.  
 
CHART No. 3 
Naila Kabeer’s Perspectives on Empowerment 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Kabeer (2005) 
 Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
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On a local perspective, empowerment must be conceptualized in regard 
to African women, while at the same time abstaining from assumptions, or 
considering them as a coherent analysis group. Yet, following da Silva (2004, p. 
132), a majority of women in this continent are burdened with a gendered image 
of motherhood. This author (2004, p. 132) underlined, for instance, that African 
cultures relate women to maternity, even favoring male children. In addition, 
Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, a Nigerian Feminist, has concluded that women 
oppression and traditions are bounded together (Da Silva, 2004; p. 134), as with 
weddings that present brides as possessions to be acquired. This is known, 
according to Wendt (1995; p. 70-73) as a social structure that depends on shared 
perceptions and expectations, and is perpetuated by practices and processes.  
 
To illustrate Ogundipe’s argument, let us contemplate the comments of 
the Islamic Sage Usman dan Fodio, ruler of the Great Islamic Empire of Sokoto. 
Reigning in today’s Nigeria (1804 – 181 BC), he drew the portrait needed on 
pious Islamic women (Njoh & Akiwumi, 2012; p. 6), establishing that they were 
expected to be concealed in their houses, not to leave except for religious duties 
(Njoh & Akiwumi, 2012; p. 6). Furthermore, women were obliged to wed, as 
one of their main duties (Njoh & Akiwumi, 2012; p. 6). Therefore, 
fundamentalists advocate maintaining traditional gender roles for women, such 
as the caregiver or the mother, while at the same time, extending their 
dominance over them (Berer & Sundari Ravidran, 1996; p. 9). These enduring 
traditions, as the Nigerian feminist stated, constitute the face of Nigerian 
Patriarchy. Furthermore, Northern Nigerian state would face a patriarchal 
customary social structure with specific gender roles for women and men.  
 
As was noted above, the empowerment discourse for this dissertation is 
based upon the United Nations, through the Millennium Development Goals. 
Conceived alongside education, Nigerian feminist thought this concept as a way 
to challenge cultural traditions that burden women with patriarchal power 
relations. These findings, nevertheless, must be contrasted on a general gender 
framework to assess its connection to Masculinities Crisis. Therefore, the next 
paragraphs will address certain constructions around Nigerian masculine identity 
contemplating both history and regional perspectives. 
	 55 
To analyze this, History Professor Uchendu (2007), of the University of 
Nigeria, relates the elements of an enduring subjugating mentality in accordance 
to what Connell (2015; p. 16) named a historical process. Masculinities in 
Nigeria involve rigidity and oppression, as a remnant of Nigerian colonial past 
(Uchendu, 2007; p. 292). This country’s history finds its background in British 
imperialism while perpetuating masculinities notions throughout the 
construction of the current gender relations between men and women. For 
instance, the British rule over Nigeria taught male privilege over women 
(Uchendu, 2007; p. 292), as they were expected to be men’s attendants in 
housekeeping. Moreover, considering the historic arguments of Uchendu (2007; 
p. 293), this further reinforced prejudice towards female education and 
employment. Hegemonic Masculinity, therefore, appears to undermine women’s 
autonomy via the enforcement of men’s privilege (Connell, 2015; p. 16).  
 
Supporting this argument, Ahmed (2006) ponders upon the existence of 
Hyper-masculinity as a historical process that accentuates dichotomous views on 
gender. According to his studies on low fundamentalists groups, he believes that 
young boys exposed to extremism are shunned from women to be shaped as 
masculine beings for their communities. They are, thus, separated from the 
feminine (Ahmed, 2006; p. 27), only to be subjects of interactions with the 
masculine. In this manner, the construction of gender is only complete once it is 
contrasted to its contrary. That is, men’s identity seems to be consummated 
when asserting their masculinity over women. As per Lemon (1995; p. 63), for 
instance, definitions of Masculinity have reacted historically to definitions of 
Femininity.  
 
To assess the existence of a binary gender perspective in Nigeria, I 
contemplate two ethnographic works on this matter, one being the conclusions 
of two local NGOs, while the other being the findings of the University of 
Nigeria. By way of illustration, let us first refer to the ethnographic study 
conducted by the two local NGOs, as it elaborates on women’s perspectives 
regarding gender equality in the Federal Republic. The Nigeria Stability and 
Reconciliation Programme (NSRP) and Voices for Change (V4C), directed a 
qualitative study over the Borno, Kaduna, Lagos and River states to estimate the 
	 56 
situation of masculinities and male privilege in this country. Their life narrative 
interviews consisted in focus group discussions (FGD) in each State. Two FGD, 
for instance, were aimed at men between 18 and 25, who were not married and 
did not have children. Moreover, two additional FGD targeted married men over 
35. Likewise, one FGD included women between 18 and 25, while another 
referred to women older than 35 (NSRP & V4C, 2016; p. 9).  
 
Nigerians interviewed by the NSRP and V4C (2016, p. 19-20) 
acknowledge that new generations face changing gender relations, as women are 
given more freedom to pursue education and a career. Nevertheless, Nigerian 
men believe they become a man depending on their education, employment and 
marital status (NSRP & V4C, 2016; p. 11), while emotion is seen as a weakness 
that impedes true manhood (NSRP & V4C, 2016; p. 12). Nigerian men also 
believe in authority, especially regarding the family given a conception of men 
as breadwinner, as elements of masculinity (NSRP & V4C, 2016; p. 12). In 
comparison, ideal women in Nigeria are seen as submissive, and supportive to 
men (NSRP & V4C, 2016; p. 14-15). Therefore, the NSRP and V4C (2016, p. 5) 
believe that Nigerian men and youth who fail to adapt to a changing power 
relation with women, tend to elicit conflict (NSRP & V4C, 2016; p. 5) 
 
Likewise, the University of Nigeria study conducted by Uchendu (2007; 
p. 289-290) on Nigerian youth follows the interview of thirty-seven Nigerian 
men and thirty-three Nigerian women that have received certain third-degree 
education. The interviewees’ age ranged from twenty to twenty-seven years old. 
Furthermore, the aim of this research was to explore the gender constructions in 
a schooled background, contrasting it with orthodox thinking. Uchendu (2007, p. 
279) therefore concludes that for Nigerian men, marriage is an important way to 
show an ideal Masculinity (i.e. Hegemonic). Likewise, having a family declares 
this identity by emphasizing virility and dominance over their children and 
wives. The result of this work aligns with the author’s thesis of a prevalent 
notion of Masculinities from a colonial past founded in power relations in regard 
to women, a conclusion that also echoes the NSRP and V4C (2016) findings. 
Nigerian men, consequently, seem to construct their manhood on violence and in 
opposition to femininity.  
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Moreover, I must underline that the aforementioned perspective on 
empowerment through information, a stance aiming women, contrasts with local 
conceptions of Education. For instance, as Danjibo (2009, p. 8) notes, northern 
Nigerian children who are taught under Islamic schooling reject western-
educated children (Danjibo, 2009; p. 8) and therefore, Western education as a 
whole. Furthermore, this author (2009; p. 8) argues the existence of an almajeri 
syndrome in more religious states. This mainly refers to male children in 
Qur’anic schools being forced to beg on the streets, so as to earn a living for 
themselves and their teachers. Considering Kabeer’s (2005) criticism on 
Empowerment, I must therefore acknowledge that there seems to be neither a 
transformative, nor an active force behind this type of education that is directed 
specifically to men.  
 
As a result, two contradictory elements have been dawn on the same 
scenario. While the empowerment discourse encourages women to defy gender 
constructions assigned to them, Nigerian Masculinities emphasize power 
relations favoring men. The ensuing consequences of the existence of both 
elements is known as Masculinities crisis. Consequently, I will finish this part of 
the second chapter contemplating studies on this form of conflict. I mainly refer 
to Lemon’s (1995) work on the reasons behind this men’s trouble, while also 
considering the criticism of Heartfield (2002) to the term. And, more 
importantly, these final paragraphs will measure the opposition men may have to 
women.  
 
It has to be noted, nevertheless, that to refer to men as a subject of 
research invokes an academic debate with diverse tendencies, especially since 
Feminism has been seen as a threat to social order and the notion of male 
privilege over women (Lemon, 1995; p. 63). As a consequence, this theory has 
been contested by different movements. The anti-feminism stances, for instance, 
argue that women do enjoy privileges and that men are the true victims of 
gender inequality. On the other hand, Pro-male movements, related to the latter, 
state that the solution to Masculinities crisis lies in re-positioning traditional 
male values to counter a feminization in social life. Finally, the pro-feminist 
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male movements agree with feminist arguments and further their work on men’s 
studies (Lemon, 1995; p. 64). This is the foundation for this chapter’s analysis of 
Masculinities Crisis: the importance of conceptualizing the identity of men 
alongside a criticism of Hegemonic Masculinity. 
 
As evidenced above, there is no true consensus on the research for men’s 
identity. This is due, partly, to an author bias on the subject. Consider, for 
instance, that the mere definition of Masculinities crisis has been contested and 
criticized by Academia, especially by pro-men movements and anti-feminist 
discourse. Yet, rather than avoiding criticism, I must dwell on it to acknowledge 
the importance of the discussion of this concept. According to Heartfield (2002; 
p. 1) the so-called Masculinities crisis would be a conceived response to a male 
loss of power to women, while at the same time demonizing men as problematic. 
This author (2002; p. 11-13) concludes that this concept does not exist. He 
believes that it is based on ideological bias that criticizes men, encourages 
passivity and emotion, and punishes resistance. For him, their loss of power is 
not due to women, but to the capital. I would like to argue, though, that this 
study is aimed to the British Society and does not consider the relation to 
violence and oppression in other parts of the world, such as the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria. Therefore, let us examine other authors on the emergence of this type 
frustration.  
 
The theory of Masculinities crisis, initially focused on the identity of men 
and their passive attitude towards the new wave of Feminism (Lemon, 1995; p. 
62). Men, thus, entered a crisis, which could only be solved once the status quo 
of Patriarchy returned to what it was before Feminism in the 60s. Their male 
victimization thesis was sustained by anti-feminist and homophobia (Lemon, 
1995; p. 62). Contemporary Masculinity Crisis theory, nevertheless, is quite a 
different picture. It states that men are constrained by patriarchal definitions of 
what it is to be a man (Lemon, 1995; p. 62). In addition, referring to the causes 
of this phenomenon, Lemon (1995, p. 63) first argues that although the 
patriarchal stereotypes are contested, mass media and religious institutions will 
perpetuate these ideals. Moreover, this plight for men is caused by women 
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emancipation movements, the gay liberation, the communication revolution and 
their declining physical and emotional health (Lemon, 1995; p. 63).  
 
The gay liberation movements, for instance, have criticized Hegemonic 
Masculinity, while at the same time being seen as transgressions to patriarchal 
order (Lemon, 1995; p. 64). Moreover, the media and the new popular culture, 
offer a contradictory image of men. It first depicts violent macho-like 
individuals, while at the same time asserting a sensitive new man (Lemon, 1995; 
p. 64). Lemon (1995, p. 68) consequently states that Masculinities crisis may be, 
in fact, a crisis of power legitimacy, as it involves male resistance to a changing 
society and the consequences of power distribution between men and women. 
This frustration refers to the negative perception of a privileged group in regard 
to minorities, like women and homosexuals, who are positioning themselves in 
traditionally man-held spheres (Lemon, 1995; p. 69).  
 
To illustrate the connection between the concepts recently addressed, the 
following chart exemplifies the relation between the Nigerian perspective on 
Masculinities, Empowerment through education and a resulting Masculinity 
crisis:  
 
CHART No. 4 
The relation between Women’s Empowerment and Masculinities Crisis 
Source: NSRP & V4C (2016), Uchendu (2007), Kabeer (2005), Lemon (1995) 
Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
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Thus, following the study of Lemon (1995), it seems the empowerment 
discourse that encourages women to follow a transformative Agency that 
contests cultural power relations causes a crisis in the Nigerian Masculinities 
imaginary. To challenge the disempower status of women involves education as 
means to de-conceptualize gender roles, such as the housewife. Meanwhile, the 
identity of men, founded in oppression from a colonial past, is unwilling to 
accept the changing gender relations. Masculinities crisis is then the result of 
this new conception of power, gender and identity, that is divergent from a 
customary patriarchal social structure. Northern Nigerian men, being taught on 
religious institutions that preserve gender roles, consider that this new 
empowering wave of education for women is alien to their culture. Boko Haram 
successfully stresses their opposition to Western-like teaching and the changing 
values of women in their society. Their actions, combined with a 
misinterpretation of Islam, vow to return to tradition. And, thus, gender-based 
violence appears. 
 
2.3. Violence as a response to the Masculinities Crisis 
 
Boko Haram seems to experience a Masculinity Crisis, as this group 
advocates to restore a previous status quo that favored Nigerian men over 
women, reinstating cultural traditions and gender roles. Empowerment through 
education is seen as a threat by these extremists, and this results in actions like 
the Chibok Girls abduction. Yet, the very acts of violence that a Masculinity 
Crisis may produce need to be analyzed as well. For this reason, I will refer to 
the theory of gender-based violence. For this discussion, nevertheless, it is 
important to recall Connell’s hierarchy of Masculinities. As a starting point, 
exploring the notions of Hegemonic Masculinity and violence may help us 
understand the motives behind Boko Haram’s attacks. 
 
Physical violence is not always present in Hegemonic Masculinities, 
given the differences among them (Connell, 2015; p. 13). Nevertheless, Connell 
(2015, p. 5) also portraits the pursuit of this ideal as a process that may cause 
specific forms of barbarity. Although hegemony does not necessarily imply 
brutality, it can include it as means of enforcement (Connell, 2015; p. 3). 
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Moreover, this can be furthered by culture, institutions and persuasion (Connell, 
2015; p. 3), which would be in accordance to a fundamentalist thinking in 
Nigeria. Hegemonic Masculinity, thus, presents itself as a viable solution to a 
contestation of a patriarchal system (Connell, 2015; p. 24), with the means 
necessary to accomplish this task. Given a Masculinity Crisis due to a loss of 
power over women, gender constructions foster this kind of conflict.  
 
The changing notions of Hegemonic Masculinity are bound to historic 
processes, seeking to reaffirm a fading masculine identity. Moreover, in a 
dichotomous society where men and women are divided from birth, young boys 
need to identify themselves as masculine beings through its symbolic 
construction (Schrock & Schwalbe, 2009; p. 281). This, in addition to a pursuit 
of the masculine ideal, will create a system devoted to men and masculinities. 
Furthermore, this will be evidenced through the existence of Male Privilege. 
Hence, before addressing gender-based violence itself, I must explore the 
constructions of entitlement that are parallel to a Masculinity crisis. Invisible to 
men, this is intertwined with culture (Bathrick & Kaufman, 2001; p. 2), and will 
only be visualized as women denounce its existence (Bathrick & Kaufman, 
2001; p. 2). Therefore, the empowerment of minorities may create a conflict 
with male privilege (Connell, 2015; p. 6; Lemon, 19995; p. 69), and conflict 
may lead to violence. 
 
Once Hegemonic Masculinity is confronted by femininity, it will try to 
eradicate it (Ahmed, 2006; p. 22). Men attempting to attain a certain masculine 
ideal may enact violence to assert that vision. Particularly, this is what Schrock 
and Schwalbe (2009, p. 281) define as manhood acts. According to these authors 
(2009, p. 282), for instance, men’s identity acquires significance through force. 
Consequently, men seek to differentiate from women and assert their 
masculinity, while at the same time perpetuate Patriarchy (Schrock & Schwalbe, 
2009; p. 287). On that account, they must perform a set of actions to declare 
their manliness in regard to other men, whilst oppressing women (Schrock & 
Schwalbe, 2009; p. 279). Therefore, Manhood acts are the actions undertaken by 
men to achieve dominance, asserting a supposed privilege, encouraging 
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women’s submission and avoiding exploitation (Schrock & Schwalbe, 2009; p. 
281).  
 
The causes of gender-based violence, as per Fried (2003, p. 96), stem 
from individual, interpersonal, institutional, and structural elements (Fried, 
2003; p. 96). All of these are based upon gender inequality, hence the uneven 
distribution of power between men and women (Fried, 2003; p. 96). As a result, 
Patriarchy must be conceived as a system that thrives under the above-
mentioned inequalities. Likewise, following Schrock & Schwalbe (2009) and 
Lemon (1995), manhood acts will accentuate a men’s identity while deterring 
minorities to challenge the status quo. Thereby, violence in men is furthered by 
the hegemonic nature of masculinities, as it serves to assert a given ruling order 
(Kaufman, 1999; p. 1). 
 
Consequently, the following paragraphs will consider the studies made 
by Kaufman (1999), as they involve both the construction of masculinity and the 
patriarchal power around it. For instance, this author (1999, p. 1) has identified 
seven different causes of violence in men, concluding on his seven Ps theory. As 
the speaker in a workshop in North Kathmandu, Kaufman elaborated his work 
following a United Nations’ perspective on the importance of involving both 
men and women to counter gender inequality. To illustrate, his postulates mainly 
refer to ideas of male privilege and entitlement that accentuate an oppressing 
identity in men, while straining them with a violent Hegemonic Masculinity 
ideal. Yet, in accordance to a post-colonial feminist methodology, I must 
highlight that I use this theory as means of exploration, rather than justification.  
 
The first element of analysis Kaufman (1999) ponders on is Patriarchal 
Power. The starting point of this discussion contemplates the enduring presence 
of Patriarchy as a system, with its changing nature, in different countries. 
Further, violence has also been interiorized in societies while being implemented 
in ideologies and social structures (Kaufman, 1999; p. 1). We could 
acknowledge, for instance, that fundamentalist thinking exemplifies this 
argument. This, then, serves as a vehicle of patriarchal power to ensure the 
existence of privileges for a group wielding it (Kaufman, 1999; p. 1). Please note 
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that Bathrick and Kaufman (2001) referred to male privilege, and its oblivious 
existence to men, as a cause of violence. Patriarchy, ergo, uses ferocity to rest 
unquestioned.  
 
The second unit of analysis for gender-based violence is Entitlement of 
Privileges (Kaufman, 1999; p. 2). Men living in a patriarchal society consider, 
consciously or unconsciously, that they possess benefits for the sole reason of 
being men. Yet, if a group of people denounce the aforementioned privileges, 
violence ensues as a way to reclaim them (Kaufman, 1999; p. 2). Empowerment 
of minorities, particularly women, tend to trigger this aspect of the Hegemonic 
masculinity identity. This resonates with Lemon’s (1995) theory of Masculinity 
crisis, a phenomenon that is provoked by a failing realignment of men to 
different power relations.  
 
This is followed by Permission (Kaufman, 1999; p. 2). Violence is not 
forbidden in society; rather, it is encouraged (Kaufman, 1999; p. 2). Brutality, 
for example, is also expressed as a rightful way to seek one’s goals in customs 
and religious teachings (Kaufman, 1999; p. 2). Although this is a generalization 
that may not be true to all communities, it may be applied to the Nigerian case. 
For instance, I contemplated Molara Ogundipe-Leslie’s arguments against 
cultural traditions as burdens that prevent gender equality. Also, Nigerian 
ethnographic studies (Uchendu, 2007; NSRP & V4C, 2016) recognize that 
culture places importance on the idea of men’s authority. Given the identity 
construction of Boko Haram, a connection seems to appear in regard to their 
violent behavior and their quest to uphold their misleading interpretations of 
Islam. 
 
The fourth P is the Paradox of Men’s Power, and it refers to the 
contradictions in which a patriarchal society is built upon (Kaufman, 1999; p. 2). 
Men’s power is based on the notions of fear and mistrust (Kaufman, 1999; p. 2), 
and the ideal of a hegemonic masculinity. Men, subsequently, react violently to 
hide the fear that has been triggered by these paradoxes (Kaufman, 1999; p. 3), 
and even to assert the status quo that has been challenged by a particular group. 
This type of violence is the result of the fear of not wielding power (Kaufman, 
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1999; p. 3), to be disempowered as women are, and be deprived of their 
authority. Furthermore, this ambiguity thesis aligns with men’s rejection of 
emotion, a finding the NSRP and V4C (2016) discovered in their interviews. 
 
Subsequently, we encounter the Psychic armor of Manhood (Kaufman, 
1999; p. 3). This relates to the construction of manhood, founded mainly on the 
detachment of the feminine, resulting on an inability to empathize with the 
feelings of others (Kaufman, 1999; p. 3). Equally, Schrock & Schwalbe (2009) 
relate manhood acts as a way to seek recognition from other men, while aiming 
to attain hegemonic masculinity. A Psychic Armor of sorts is therefore 
constructed around a society that conceives gender in binary terms. Moreover, 
detaching men from femininity only perpetuates a hyper-masculine environment 
that serves to accentuate fundamentalism (Ahmed, 2006; p. 22) 
 
The sixth unit of analysis is Masculinity as a Pressure Cooker (Kaufman, 
1999; p. 3). This involves the way men are taught to suppress their emotions, 
later channeling them into anger (Kaufman, 1999; p. 3). Manhood is 
consequently constructed around power and control, meaning that if men lack 
these elements, they are not men at all (Kaufman, 1999; p. 4). This argument can 
be associated with the differentiation of men and women, excluding emotions as 
a feminine attribute (NSRP & V4C, 2016).  
 
The final P refers to Past Experiences, which encompass previous 
encounters with violence that men have endured (Kaufman, 1999; p. 4). This 
may include, for instance, the violence expressed among men and against them. 
As for Boko Haram, violence has been an underpinning element of its 
relationship between civilians and the Nigerian State, marking their behavior 
with a forceful stance. Let us recall, for instance, the extrajudicial killings of 
2009 that Maiangwa et al. (2012) illustrated as an abuse of power from the 
Nigerian State. These events, coupled with the attacks and bombings of the 
fundamentalists, define the violent behavior of this group.  
 
By means of illustration, Chart N. 5, summarizes Kaufman’s (1999) 
seven Ps of gender-based violence, underlining that these are a power 
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construction around a patriarchal system. Further, it must be noted that Boko 
Haram’s acts seem to line along these arguments, which would give us an 
insight regarding cultural male privilege and the entitlement over women that 
traditions seems to impose.  
 
CHART No. 5 
Kaufman’s Gender-based violence Seven Ps 
Source: Kaufman (1999) 
Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
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Haram must contemplate the group’s misinterpretations of religion. 
Fundamentalism focuses on asserting an identity that has been threaten to 
disappear, giving meaning to the lives of its members and regaining power 
(Mernissi, 1988; p. 8). Mernissi (1988, p. 10) believes that, based on a feeling of 
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To illustrate, low fundamentalists, such as Boko Haram, do not cultivate 
Logos, or logical reason, and lack Eros, or sensibility. Communities that are 
deprived from both Eros and Logos perpetuates itself through violence (Ahmed, 
2006; p. 26). This type of response, furthermore, originates from a hyper-
masculine environment, scenarios characterized by casting aside into oblivion 
the notions of femininity, both theologically and psychologically. The feminine 
is estranged into the notion of the other (Ahmed, 2006; p. 22), as a way to 
reclaim individuality. As was noted above, Boko Haram appears to follow a 
Mawdudi-inspired conception of Islam that particularly emphasizes Masculinity 
in opposition to women. That is, their identity acquires significance only if 
contrasted with another element.  
 
Empowered women, under the United Nations’ terms, caused Muslim 
societies to oppose this conception of changing power relations, as it represented 
a new set of boundaries (Mernissi, 1988; p. 9) and the loss of identity. For 
instance, the Taliban in Pakistan are an example of the obliteration of the 
feminine in a theological context. It means the lack of different spiritual virtues 
associated with Allah, which are seen as weakness to these extremists. For 
instance, Ahmed (2006, p. 25) acknowledges that these would be Mercy, 
Compassion, Love and Peace, among others. These qualities may also be 
rejected by Nigerians, who deem emotions as feminine (NSRP & V4C, 2016), 
indicating that Boko Haram also accentuated its distance from any notion of 
femininity.  
 
As per Bathrick and Kaufman (2001, p. 1), men use violence as a 
successful way to deter a challenge to their authority, to maintain control and 
perpetuate the status quo. At the same time, fundamentalism seeks to regain 
control over society, and in a more specific sense, over women that have sought 
autonomy (Berer & Sundari Ravidran, 1996; p. 8). This situation seems to 
endure, as it was already noted in 2001 by the then United Nations Development 
Fund for Women, or UNIFEM. The subordinated status of women in society has 
been legitimized by culture and traditions, as well as norms and social 
institutions, leaving women in a disempowered status in regard to men. 
Although a predecessor to UN Women, UNIFEM nevertheless remarked a 
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predominant situation that is also relevant and present in the ethnographic 
findings of Uchendu (2007), and the NSRP and V4C (2016). 
 
The use of brutality, or the very threat of it, diminishes the presence of 
women in society (Fried, 2003; p. 91). In other words, manhood acts serve as 
deterrence to avoid change regarding existing power relations and traditions. 
Hence, violence impedes women to be conceived as first-class citizens, and is 
also an obstacle to upholding their human rights (Fried, 2003; p. 91). 
Furthermore, being found in different spheres of social life such as religion 
(Fried, 2003; p. 91), gender-based violence attacks women depending on 
different elements of their identity (Fried, 2003; p. 91). Yet, analyzing violent 
manhood acts towards women is, in fact, connected to violence against other 
men, and against themselves (Kaufman, 1999; p. 1). This would further give us 
insights to contrast Boko Haram’s use of cruelty, its identity, and their 
interpretation of Islam. 
 
Fundamentalist agendas vow to return to a moral order that has been 
contested, thus reinforcing abandoned gender roles for women (Berer & Sundari 
Ravidran, 1996; p. 8). It has rejected feminism, mainly the United Nations’ 
perspective on Empowerment, as a divisive force that has alienated women from 
their husbands and families (Berer & Sundari Ravidran, 1996; p. 9). Thus, it 
opposes this stance as a contradiction to their interests (Berer & Sundari 
Ravidran, 1996; p. 9), that is, demonizing gender equality. Therefore, the quest 
of the disempowered to regain control over their own lives can be violent, as a 
way to maintain the reigning order of society, Patriarchy. 
 
Masculinity Crisis are triggered once men fail to consider the changing 
power relations, a consequence to women’s empowerment. Yet, on a deeper 
level, this type of frustration is mainly due to a condemnation of preconceived 
male privileges that have granted men dominion over women. Burdened by 
traditions and patriarchal culture, they should comply by the status quo of 
Patriarchy. Nevertheless, if women denounce male privilege and empower 
themselves in regard to an active and transformative agency, this situation can 
be aggravated by violence. In fact, following Kaufman’s (1999) theory on 
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gender-based violence, we can acknowledge that this kind of conflict is rooted in 
the construction of the identity of men. Therefore, using religion as a façade, 
groups like Boko Haram consider violence as a deterrent factor to halt the 
contestation of their privilege.  
  
Thus, following the specific objective for this chapter, which was to 
study the existence of a masculinities crisis given women empowerment through 
education, Boko Haram seems to perpetuate an idea of Hegemonic Masculinity 
that is threatened to disappear. Yet, the first overview of this group’s identity 
lacked a gender perspective that would refer to the root causes for its violent 
behavior and actions. Moreover, an exploration of these terms indicates that the 
Nigerian fundamentalists seem to align to a Mawdudi-inspired perspective that 
defines masculinity in opposition to the West, God and Women. Under the 
banner of an alleged pure Islam, these extremists in fact seek to impose 
traditions and cultural norms upon those who question them. As a parallel 
occurrence, Nigeria is also influenced by the United Nations’ empowerment 
discourse, which encourages women to challenge power relations and 
Patriarchy. Accordingly, men who failed to adapt to these changes experienced a 
Masculinities crisis, as their male privilege was denounced, and their power over 
women questioned. Boko Haram, therefore, in an attempt to assert its identity, 
enacted violent manhood acts to reinstate the previous status quo. And, the main 
specific manhood act I will focus on is the events that occurred on April 14th, 
2014.  
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3. CHAPTER III: CHIBOK KIDNAPPING AS AN ATTACK TO WOMEN 
 
The specific objective for this final methodological chapter is to interpret 
Boko Haram’s terrorist response to girls’ empowerment through education using 
Gender Theory. Therefore, to understand the Chibok Schoolgirls abduction, I 
must first refer to the national situation concerning girls’ school enrollment and 
relate it to the gender construction around Boko Haram’s identity. This will be 
followed by an analysis of Masculinities Crisis, and the use of gender-based 
violence that led a group of men to assert their Hegemonic Masculinity through 
this event. Moreover, I conclude this part of the dissertation exploring a new 
proposal on education for both men and women, a perspective that may counter 
Nigeria’s divisive perspective on masculinity/femininity, and thus prevent future 
conflict related to Boko Haram.  
 
While the Government applauds progress made to attain Gender Parity in 
educational institutions, Northern Nigerian states are exposed to dichotomous 
gender notions and fundamentalist indoctrination. Further, this constitutes a 
Patriarchal society that perpetuates male privilege. Yet, once their traditions are 
contested by educated girls, groups like Boko Haram feel that one of the core 
elements that define their gender construction is threatened. Hegemonic 
Masculinity, the sole solution for these militants, would turn to violence so as to 
deter women from furthering their contestation of Patriarchy, resulting in violent 
manhood acts.  
 
This type of actions seems to explain the Chibok kidnappings of April 
14, 2014. Relying on a Human Rights Watch’s (2014) ethnographic study on the 
girls that escaped Boko Haram, I explore the unspoken motives that caused this 
violent reaction from this group. Moreover, I recall Kaufman’s (1999) analysis 
on gender-based violence and male privilege, as I attempt to identify the reasons 
behind their alleged entitlement over women. Although the militants have not 
made overt declaration regarding gender equality, this methodological 
discussion relates theory and qualitative information to illustrate how their 
Hegemonic Masculinity ideal contrasts to women empowerment.  
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Finally, the last part of this Chapter envisions a possible solution to 
counter Boko Haram and avoid future conflicts. While stressing that this 
solution would be valid in the long-term, I also emphasize the need to use a 
gender perspective in education. Including both men and women, a characteristic 
of African Feminism, is one of the elements that proposes the deconstruction of 
patriarchal values. Further, this new empowering gender perspective in 
Education could serve to unite a dichotomous society that thinks about gender in 
binary terms, while avoiding a hyper-masculine environment that elicits violence 
and the settling of male privilege.  
 
3.1. Boko Haram’s Ideals of Masculinity as opposed to Women Education 
 
Both previous chapters served to outline the context in which Boko 
Haram thrived, alongside theoretical arguments that explored perspectives on the 
Nigerian extremists’ identity. Consequently, these paragraphs already addressed 
how a fragile Hegemonic Masculinity ideal could shatter once exposed to the 
empowerment of women, and the contestation of their privileges. Yet, to discuss 
this group’s stance regarding girls’ education, I must first contemplate the 
Nigerian situation under these terms. That is, I will rely on facts and figures 
related to literacy, school attendance, and the Federal Republic’s position on the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
 
For instance, the Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the Nigerian 
President on Millennium Development Goals (2015, p. 5) affirms that this 
country has witnessed increasing equality in both primary and secondary 
educational levels, despite what the Government considered a “prevailing 
patriarchal culture”. Likewise, the Nigerian National Bureau of Statistics (2015, 
p. 7-8) states that, following the Gender Parity Index, Nigeria accomplished the 
proposed objective in the Third Millennium Development Goal. Empowerment, 
strictly under this sense, referred to parity in attendance of boys and girls in 
academic institutions. Therefore, in 2014, there was a girl for every boy enrolled 
in school. This relation is exemplified in the following chart:  
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CHART No. 6 
Gender Parity Index Evolution in Nigeria from 2008 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: The National Bureau of Statistics (2015) 
 Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres  
 
Other perspectives related to Nigeria’s progress in girls’ education are 
illustrated by the United Nations Children’s Fund. For instance, this organization 
found that the literacy rate of women between 15 and 24 years descended from 
80% in 2008 to 58% before 2012, only to ascend to 66% in the same year 
(UNICEF, 2013; The National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Chart No. 7. 
contemplates these changing figures from 2004 to 2014:   
 
CHART No. 7 
Literacy Rate of Women, 15 to 24 years old, from 2004 to 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics (2015) 
Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
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the Northern part of this country, I should also correlate data concerning how 
empowerment, according to the United Nations’ perspective, is uneven in each 
state. For instance, in 2007, UNICEF (2007; p. 1) already noted the unequal 
situation of girls’ access to basic education, claiming it remains low on northern 
states. For example, about 20% of Nigerian women in this territory were literate 
and have attended school (UNICEF, 2007; p. 1). The National Bureau of 
Statistics agrees with this position, and demonstrates that little advancement has 
been made, as shown by the following table:  
 
TABLE No. 2 
Literacy Rate among Women, 15 to 24 years old in 2014,  
in selected states 
Northern States Southern States 
State Percentage  State Percentage 
Sokoto 10,70% Rivers 98,00% 
Bauchi 13,00% Enugu 97,00% 
Yobe 16,00% Imo 95,00% 
Borno 20,00% Delta 94,10% 
Source: The National Bureau of Statistics (2015) 
 Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
  
The official position of the Nigerian Government praises their 
advancement in regard to women’s education. Yet, data concerning the Northern 
states, the same that have adopted Sharia Law, seem to indicate otherwise. For 
example, in 2007, UNICEF (2007, p. 1) already considered that it is more likely 
that girls do not participate in education than boys in this region. The National 
Bureau of Statistics (2015) corroborates this information. Furthermore, contrary 
to the United Nation’s perspective, Njho and Akiwumi (2012; p. 14) found a 
negative relation between the empowerment discourse espoused by the 
Millennium Development Goals and African Muslim Women. To illustrate, 
these authors argue that these women are not deemed empowered in regard to 
their participation on education attendance, literacy, non-agricultural 
employment, and political participation (Njoh & Akiwumi, 2012; p. 14).  
 
In like manner, the perspectives on education in this country are different 
depending on the region. For instance, while the Government hailed its progress 
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in gender parity on the country as a whole, Northern Nigerian States dismiss 
Western education and women education altogether. Quoting Sanusi (2007), 
Danjibo (2009, p. 8) states that this system of isolation from Western education 
dates back from colonial times, when British authorities collaborated with emirs 
to shield the North from any foreign influence, including the South’s (Danjibo, 
2009; p. 8). As a result, this country differs between the types of education 
children have, depending on their states: makarantan boko or western-education 
schools, makarantan addini or the schools for religious instruction, and 
makarantan allo or the Qur’anic schools (Danjibo, 2009; p. 8).   
 
Indeed, as expressed by Table No.2, girls in Northern states do not enroll 
as much in schools if compared to Southern states. Moreover, male children are 
the only ones that receive some kind of education, taught under religious 
schools, and expected to beg for their teachers. This phenomenon, according to 
Danjibo (2009; p. 8), is known as almajeri syndrome. Hopkins (2006, p. 337-
341) corroborates this information, as the author defines that the public sphere is 
masculine territory, whereas the private sphere is feminine. On this extremist 
notions of binary construction, women are relegated to their houses. 
Furthermore, Hopkins’ (2006, p. 337) findings on the perception of attending 
school as a feminine behavior is relevant to the Northern Nigerian states, where 
Western-like education is ridiculed. 
 
Additionally, ActionAid (2012), an International Non-Governmental 
Organization that works with women education in Nigeria, believes the current 
situation for girls and empowerment is due to the gender roles imposed on them. 
As per da Silva (2004), this echoes the African Feminism perspectives on 
patriarchal obstacles. These involve motherhood or a caregiver image 
(ActionAid, 2012; p. 16). Nevertheless, Nigerian girls aspire to receive 
education, regardless of poverty and possible pregnancy and marriage 
(ActionAid, 2012; p. 4). Moreover, the Nigerian State, which issued its’ 2006 
Gender Policy, stressed the importance of female education to increase 
development (ActionAid, 2012; p. 8). In this regard, federal and local 
governments, NGOs and some religious organizations advocate support for these 
measures (ActionAid, 2012; p. 8). Seemingly, this constitutes a positive scenario 
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for empowerment, in opposition to Boko Haram’s demands in favor of 
traditions. 
 
In accordance to what Kabeer (2005) considered as empowerment, 
Nigerian girls who received education apparently question their gender roles. 
This is exemplified in the qualitative interviews to those who attended the 
Transforming Education for Girls Program. Organized by ActionAid (2012, p. 
13), the study, conducted on 629 girls, showed that starting in 2008, 41% of the 
interviewees considered early marriage an obstacle to education. By 2012, this 
percentage decreased to 28%, demonstrating that a majority of the interviewees 
did not feared to be wedded before ending their studies. Likewise, ActionAid 
(2012, p. 14) found that 85% of the girls in their program stated they had the 
same rights to education as boys. Eighty-three percent considered that society 
should encourage girls to pursue higher studies (ActionAid, 2012; p. 14). Further 
conclusions appear to relate urbanization and the access to information 
(ActionAid, 2012; p. 15). This would explain the opposition of the impoverished 
rural Northern states to girls’ education. 
 
This qualitative study, alongside the figures exposed by the Nigerian 
Government, correlate education with a way of contestation to patriarchal 
structures. For instance, as per Kabeer (2005, p. 13-14), girls without schooling 
would be placed in a disempowered status, relying on education to regain the 
right to choose and manage their own life again. That is, to reclaim the ability to 
decide over many possibilities that are both extant and visible. Likewise, 
according to Molara Ogundipe-Leslie (da Silva, 2004), African Feminism needs 
to de-construct customary gender roles to overcome obstacles to education, such 
as pregnancy and poverty. Girls are thus empowered once they are given the 
ability to decide over important matters in their lives, such as pursuing a career 
and deciding to marry once they end their studies. Yet, while women cast aside 
these traditions, a failing ability of some men to adapt to these new power 
structures may cause conflict.  
 
The Nigerian Government, following the United Nations’ perspective, 
states that girls’ attendance to school may provide gender equality. In this 
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manner, I need to recall Kabeer’s (2005, p. 13-15) criticism on empowerment to 
find if education in itself is the resource used to achieve autonomy. Thus, let us 
contemplate one of the author’s arguments: a fueling Agency that is both active 
and transformative. Active, as it involves actions against the existent power 
structures, such as patriarchal values that neglect women the ability to be 
independent. And transformative, as its outcomes result in women contesting the 
gender norms assigned to them, such as their roles as premature mothers and 
caregivers (Berer & Sundari Ravidran, 1996; p. 9). On this subject, the National 
Bureau of Statistics (2015) and ActionAid (2012) found an improvement on 
gender parity. For instance, the girls that attended the Transforming Education 
Program commenced to conceive equal opportunities in comparison to their 
male peers, and eventually dismissed early marriage as their obligation. 
Furthermore, their findings resonate with that of Dr. Uzoma Aja-Okorie (2013; 
p. 278), from the Nigerian University of Abakaliki. To illustrate her conclusions, 
she indicates that educated women tend to marry at 25 or 30 years, an antithesis 
to early-wedding traditions.   
 
As it was stated in the previous chapter, Empowerment revolves around 
the ability to regain autonomy from someone else that wields power against a 
disempowered group. Moreover, this also entails contesting the already existing 
gender relations that are perpetuated by culture. As per the Senior Special 
Assistant to the Nigerian President on Millennium Development Goals (2015, p. 
5), and the ethnographic studies of both NSRP & V4C (2016) and Uchendu 
(2007), Nigeria seems to be exposed to patriarchal traditions founded in binary 
perceptions of gender. Therefore, this dissertation explores the conception of 
Northern Nigerian women as a disempowered group, while acknowledging the 
power of men, like Boko Haram, that stems from Male Privilege. To illustrate, 
Kabeer’s (2005) findings point that Boko Haram possesses a negative agency as 
they feel they have an authority over women. In contrast to the transformative 
nature of women empowerment, i.e. the power to change the status quo (Kabeer, 
2005; p. 14), men like these extremists conceive it as a threat to one of the 
deepest elements of their identity. Likewise, this new-found autonomy could 
destabilize a patriarchal structure that is, as per Wendt (1995, p. 73), constructed 
by shared understandings and expectations of gender norms.  
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Accordingly, gender-based violence studies relate that men who believe 
to be entitled to women, be it to their bodies or their very agency, dread this 
change. Consequently, in an inability to adapt to the changing power structures, 
they react violently to assert the former cultural status quo. On this regard, it is 
important to return to the construction of the masculine ideal in Boko Haram’s 
terms and, more importantly, their opposition towards women. Up until this 
point, we have outlined the situation regarding women’s education in this 
country. It must be noted, therefore, that this discourse is based upon the 
commitment of the Nigerian Government to the Millennium Development 
Goals, alongside the African Feminism denouncement of patriarchal traditions. 
Yet, bearing in mind that Boko Haram claims an utter disregard for Western 
values (Onuaha, 2010; p. 57), the whole idea of women’s empowerment is alien 
to this group, dismissing it as a globalizing invention that threatens their customs 
and their identity.   
 
As it was concluded on Chapter II, Boko Haram is, in fact, defending 
their idea of Hegemonic Masculinity, establishing that it should reign over a 
social hierarchy and over other gender constructions that shape men in Nigeria 
(Connell, 2015; p. 3). In addition, the struggle of this group against the 
Government, aside from being a socio-economic consequence, exemplifies their 
quest to assert their masculinity, particularly in regard to women. Considering 
Connell (2015; p. 7-24), Hegemonic Masculinity is bound to a historical process 
and a local context, thus prone to be contested. Therefore, her theory provides a 
starting point to outline the conflict and frustration of the Nigerian 
fundamentalists. For instance, the local context Connell contemplated could be 
the Northern Nigerian states, where different perspectives on Masculinity 
parallel fundamentalist stances. It is important to mention, nonetheless, that 
Boko Haram’s gender constructions may not be applied to a global context in 
itself. Rather, it is a local manifestation of Patriarchy, replicated in the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria.  
 
Boko Haram, thus, exemplifies the consequences of a fading patriarchal 
culture in regard to a growing autonomy for women. Therefore, these extremists 
permeate their Hegemonic Masculinity idea with a religious banner, abiding by a 
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fundamentalist political agenda. Likewise, as a Salafi group, Boko Haram only 
considers early teachings of Islam and literal interpretations to the Quran 
(Thurston, 2016; p. 9). These arguments help us separate Boko Haram from an 
alleged religious perspective, identifying them in terms of their identity and 
gender constructions. For instance, after analyzing the group’s historic 
evolution, it seems that they comply with a Mawdudi-inspired gender 
construction that defines identity in contrast to God, the West and women (De 
Sondy, 2013; p. 12).  
 
De Sondy’s (2013) arguments are further explained with Boko Haram’s 
rejection of the constitutional secularity of the Nigerian State. Their action, 
coupled with their claims over the only pure Islam followers in Nigeria, 
accentuate how these militants define themselves in regard to Allah. 
Furthermore, their opposition to the West is already stated through their name, 
as they condemn mainly democracy (Adesoji, 2010; p. 99), encouraging devout 
Muslims to avoid participating in this alleged corrupted invention. Likewise, this 
resistance is rooted as a reaction to a fading identity that feels intimidated by the 
growing globalization in Nigeria. To illustrate, I must underline their goal, an 
Islamic State, where unaltered Sharia Law would provide justice for all 
Nigerians (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p 42). In the same manner, women 
empowerment, is a foreign notion to these militants. 
 
This dissertation addressed the first elements of Boko Haram’s masculine 
identity on chapter I. Yet, the following chapters explored the complex notions 
of gender constructions according to this group. For instance, following the 
Mawdudi-inspired theory, the masculine construction of Boko Haram is only 
completed once they have shunned themselves from the feminine, creating an 
irreconcilable distance between men and women. Basing themselves on a binary 
perception of society, these militants despise the Nigerian Constitution as it 
grants equality to women and homosexuals (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 46). 
Nevertheless, girls that started challenging these toxic notions of Hegemonic 
Masculinity by empowerment via an active and transformative agency, provoked 
that this group felt its idea of masculinity threatened.   
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In this manner, considering ethnographic studies based upon Nigerian 
perceptions concerning education and gender, and the figures of women’s 
participation in school, the Government declared the existence of an “enduring 
patriarchal culture” that is changing to a different one where girls are being 
educated, thus contesting these notions. This would confirm Kabeer’s (2005) 
criticism on empowerment to generate both an active and transformative agency. 
Yet, this situation differs in Northern States, where a patriarchal structure relates 
to male-only religious education. Following a dichotomous perspective on 
gender, cultural norms distance men from women and acknowledge their 
masculinity in opposition to God, the West, and women. This Mawdudi-inspired 
logic is present in Boko Haram, as it allegedly condemns Western-values and 
the disruption of traditions. Therefore, women’s empowerment through 
education, a notion alien to this group, would be dismissed as an invention 
originating from Globalization. As a result, they would oppose this idea so as to 
assert their identity as men. That being so, a girls-only institution, such as the 
Chibok Government School, could be considered a threat to their very idea of 
Hegemonic Masculinity.  
 
3.2. Boko Haram’s Violence as means of Subjugation to the Chibok Girls  
 
Concerning women’s education, Nigeria faces two different scenarios. 
On the one hand, the Government hails its progress to attain the Third 
Millennium Development Goal, stressing that Gender Parity in Schools has been 
achieved. Nevertheless, Northern Nigerian states, the area of influence of Boko 
Haram, are exposed to low literacy rate for women and fundamentalist 
indoctrination for boys. As a consequence, the Nigerian extremists consider 
women empowerment as a threat to both their culture and their male privileges. 
Frustrated as they were with these changing gender relations, this group seemed 
to consider a manhood act as a way of deterrence to avoid further contestations 
to their idea of Hegemonic Masculinity. Thus, the following paragraphs will 
explore the abduction of the Chibok Schoolgirls that appears to exemplify these 
arguments, as the Masculinities crisis noted on chapter II.  
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Being responsible for snatching at least 500 girls in Northern Nigeria, 
with 276 girls from Chibok alone (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 1), Boko 
Haram appears to feel entitled over women. To further explore this 
phenomenon, I should analyze reports concerning their violent acts and 
kidnappings. Consequently, I contemplate Human Rights Watch’s (2014) 
ethnographic study Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp that relates the gender-
based violence suffered by the victims of this group. The interviews, conducted 
from June to August 2014, illustrate the life narrative of 30 persons abducted 
from April 2013 to April 2014, and the account of 16 witnesses (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014; p. 1).  
 
Regarding the evolution of this group’s tactics, Human Rights Watch 
(2014, p. 1) seems to echo Walker (2012, p. 4), as this organization notes that 
Boko Haram’s attacks have shifted from governmental targets to civilians. 
Moreover, the group allegedly assaults those who refused to convert to Islam, 
kidnapping especially Christian women (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 16), and 
claiming that the abduction of schoolgirls is due to a punishment for their 
Western education, or a lack of devotion to Islam (Human Rights Watch, 2014; 
p. 20). As means of illustration, consider the interview of a 17-year-old girl who 
escaped after the events in Chibok: 
 
What kind of knowledge are you looking for here? Since you are here to look for 
Western education, we are here to confront it and teach you the ways of Islam – Words 
of a Boko Haram militant the day of the abduction of the Chibok Schoolgirls  
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 20) 
 
On April 14, 2014, Boko Haram arrived to the Government Girls 
Secondary School in Chibok, in the Christian area of Borno State (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014; p. 27). On that same day, the schoolgirls were supposed to 
take their West African School Certificate, a series of examinations intended for 
English-speaking students (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 22). According to the 
Chibok schoolgirls that managed to escape, the Nigerian fundamentalists 
probably broke into the school grounds to steal from the brick-making machine 
and gather food and supplies (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 23). Yet, facing no 
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other obstacle, they initially pretended to be policemen and later abducted 276 
girls from this institution (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 23). 
 
Two men told us we should not worry, we should not run. They said they had come to 
save us from what is happening inside the town, that they are policemen. We did not 
know that they were from Boko Haram. The rest of the men came and started shouting 
‘Allahu Akbar’ and at that moment we realized, they were Boko Haram. We were told 
to be quiet. One of them told us that the horrible things we heard happening elsewhere, 
like burning houses, killing people, killing students, kidnapping people, would happen 
to us now. We all started crying and he told us to shut up – Words from a 18-year-old 
Chibok schoolgirl regarding her abduction  
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 23) 
 
In addition, the group’s success regarding the Chibok abductions 
promptly led Boko Haram to consider kidnapping girls as a new modus operandi 
in their jihad against the Nigerian State (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 23). 
Conversely, although the assault on the Chibok Girls School does not appear to 
have been previously planned, it reveals the ulterior motives behind such 
attacks. For instance, Boko Haram’s militants claim that they were, in fact, 
saving women from discrimination and mundane burdens, like work. As it was 
later stated, women would be freed from these pains, for they would convert to 
Islam in the Islamic Kingdom Boko Haram claims to reign (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014; p. 1): 
 
You are no longer in Nigeria. You are now in an Islamic kingdom. Here, women’s 
rights are respected, not like in Nigeria where women are made to work, farm, fetch 
water and firewood, and where you have all types of discrimination. This is the reason 
why we are rescuing Christian women like you. In our Islamic kingdom, there will be no 
discrimination because everyone will be Muslims – Words from a Boko Haram militant 
to a 19-year-old detainee  
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 1)  
 
Following the claims of Boko Haram, a connection must be drawn 
between the alleged cultural traditions they wish to defend and the existence of 
Patriarchy in Nigeria. As noted above, women’s education seems to challenge 
these cultural expressions while at the same time deflating part of the militant’s 
masculine persona. Likewise, this frustration could result in gender-based 
violence. For this reason, in the following paragraphs, I refer to Human Rights 
Watch (2014; p. 25) as the organization retells how girls in abduction were 
exposed to violence, especially Christian and schoolgirls. On this matter, 
interviews highlighted the physical abuse and labor they were meant to endure. 
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For instance, they were forced to follow a caregiver role, performing diverse 
chores in Boko Haram’s camp, such as cleaning and cooking (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014; p. 26). Girls were also told to participate in armed conflicts, 
whereas by guarding ammunition or by luring security forces into a trap (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014; p. 26). Sometimes, they were forced to kill captives 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 26).  
 
It must be stressed that the experiences of women within the 
fundamentalists’ camp should not be generalized, as it depends on different 
factors. To illustrate, some girls were not put into work because of their beauty, 
according to Boko Haram’s militants, and were served by the others (Human 
Rights Watch, 2014; p. 27). Yet, the rest of them suffered violence and 
punishments because of their faith. For instance, interviewees told Human 
Rights Watch (2014, p.28) that Christian girls were threatened to death if they 
did not convert to Islam. Girls were also forced to wed the group’s members 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 30). Reportedly, Abubakar Shekau decided this 
kind of fate for the Chibok girls (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 31). 
 
In accordance to this alleged entitlement over the body of women, some 
were raped or sexually abused during their abduction (Human Rights Watch, 
2014; p. 33-35). The life narrative contemplated by Human Rights Watch (2014; 
p. 33-35) confirms that insurgents molested them regardless of their marital 
status. Other reasons also included their faith and not having supported their 
cause (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 35): 
 
When we arrived at the camp they left us under a tree. I managed to sleep; I was 
exhausted and afraid. Late in the night, two insurgents shook me and another woman 
awake, saying their leader wanted to see us. We had no choice but to follow them, but 
as soon as we moved deep into the woods, one of them dragged me away, while his 
partner took the other woman in another direction. I guessed what they had in mind and 
began to cry. I begged him, telling him I was a married woman. He ignored my pleas, 
flung me on the ground, and raped me. I could not tell anyone what happened, not even 
my husband. I still feel so ashamed and cheated. The other woman told me she was also 
raped, but vowed never to speak of it again as she was single and believes that news of 
her rape would foreclose her chances of marriage – Words of a 19-year-old victim 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; 35) 
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The actions of Boko Haram against women cannot be assumed as simple 
manifestations of violence. Indeed, the causes that at first glimpse seem invisible 
must be explored in relation to the theoretical foundation of this dissertation. On 
this matter, the following paragraphs will consider how Masculinities Theory, 
gender-based violence, and further elaborations on the group’s identity apply to 
the events of April 14th. As a starting point, it must be mentioned that the 
abduction of the Chibok Girls occurred in a Government Girls Secondary School 
(Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 63), which supports the idea that Boko Haram 
opposes both the Nigerian State and Women Empowerment. Moreover, feeling 
that education was a threat to their idea of Hegemonic Masculinity, this group 
allegedly enacted violence as a way to stress this same idea as a solution to the 
contestation of their patriarchal power (Connell, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the violence the girls endured during captivity apparently 
responds to the gender roles Nigerian Muslim women were culturally assigned. 
For instance, as was noted on chapter II, Boko Haram apparently conceive 
traditions in accordance to the teachings of Usaman dan Fodio, the Islamic Sage 
of the Great Islamic Empire of Sokoto, who stated that pious women were meant 
to be concealed in their houses, and to be wedded as an obligation to men (Njoh 
& Akiwumi, 2012; p. 6). Moreover, this self-proclaimed entitlement over 
women would be influenced by the remnants of the British rule in Nigeria, the 
colonial past firstly addressed in chapter I, the same which furthered the idea of 
servitude for men, increasing the division of men and women in terms of 
employment and education years to come (Uchendu, 2007; p. 292-293).  
 
Parallel to these traditions, other ideas thrived under the discourse of the 
United Nations. For instance, women’s education, as demonstrated by Kabeer 
(2005), NSRP & V4C (2016), and ActionAid (2012), would encourage girls to 
challenge these patriarchal obstacles. Nonetheless, Boko Haram interpreted this 
form of agency as an act against their male identity, and later stressed their idea 
of Hegemonic Masculinity as a solution to this contestation of their male 
privilege. This, as Connell (2015, p. 24) states, is a driving force to position 
itself among a supposed threat, possibly entailing violence. 
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Moreover, following my analysis on the fundamentalist stance of Boko 
Haram and its historic evolution, it is important to recall the principal mission of 
this group, to purge the Nigerian State form corruption and its vices (Onuaha, 
2010; p. 57). Thus, these extremists exemplify their beliefs via izhar al-din, 
through their public actions (Thurston, 2016; p. 12). Therefore the Chibok 
abduction could be interpreted as a faithful behavior, under their perspective. 
Yet, as a fundamentalist agency, it uses religion as a standard to further a 
political agenda. It is likely, therefore, that these militants experience a 
Masculinities Crisis, as their patriarchal values are contested while they attempt 
to assert them (Lemon, 1995; p. 62).  
 
The very abduction of the Chibok Schoolgirls also relates to what 
Schrock and Schwalbe (2009, p. 282) named as manhood acts. Hence, this event 
could be analyzed as an action to distinguish men from women, while at the 
same time maintaining male privilege and the existent status quo. The authors 
mention that these type of efforts are aimed to oppress women, or rather to 
maintain their disempowered status. For instance, they are meant to reinforce 
dominance, privilege, submission and exploitation (Schrock & Schwalbe, 2009; 
p. 281). On this matter, it is important to analyze the Chibok kidnapping as a 
manhood act of gender-based violence. Accordingly, I regard Kaufman’s (1999, 
p. 1-4) study of how a Hegemonic Masculinity in crisis may be explained 
through the author’s Seven Ps. 
 
Following his gender-based theory (1999) addressed in chapter II, I relate 
concepts of Male Privilege, Hegemonic Masculinity, and additional information 
regarding the subject of study. Therefore, I start this discussion by firstly 
encountering that Nigerian Northern States already exhibit the existence of 
patriarchal power as traditions has been passed down through generations. As a 
social construction, dating from the XIX century and the British rule over the 
country, women were relegated to their houses to serve men. Further, the 
perspectives of local Feminists, such as Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, affirm the 
existence of a patriarchal culture that instills gendered roles, such as mothers and 
caregivers (da Silva, 2004; p. 132). Hegemonic Masculinity, depending on a 
local context, perpetuates these relations. For instance, as Njoh and Akiwumi 
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(2012, p. 6) state, this region appears to be influenced by cultural perceptions of 
women as wives who must be jealously concealed, not to participate in the 
public sphere. Additionally, the historic account of Professor Uchendu (2007) 
concludes that these power structures neglected them aside from employment 
and education. Therefore, a violent manhood act as the Chibok abduction is in 
accordance with what Bathrick and Kaufman (2001) considered as deterrence to 
challenge Patriarchy. 
 
Concerning the entitlement of Privileges of Boko Haram, it is important 
to note that the militants of this group do not consider the existence of these 
benefits, arguing that they, in fact, were helping women to be free from 
servitude. For this reason, their devout public deeds, izhar al-adin, involved 
kidnapping the schoolgirls from Chibok. Yet, recalling the life narratives 
collected by Human Rights Watch (2014), I must stress that these extremists 
believed their actions were just and in benefit of women. On this aspect, these 
girls appear to embody the end of the invisible privileges their culture 
constituted, hence using violence to insist on their Hegemonic Masculinity. 
Regarding this idea, it is important to highlight Lemon’s (1995, p. 63) remarks 
on Masculinities crisis. As the author concluded, empowering minorities will 
cause conflict with the ruling elite. That is, a transformative education will 
threaten the negative agency that Boko Haram, as a group of men, wields over 
women. 
 
Further, society encourages the permission needed to trigger gender-
based violence, as its power structures acknowledge the submission of women 
over men. This follows the previous arguments on a patriarchal culture, and the 
entitlement of women’s bodies to serve men. Consequently, Boko Haram’s 
actions are based upon their misunderstanding, a fundamentalist stance, of 
Qur’anic teachings, finding support for their actions on these perceptions. 
Recalling Ahmed’s (2006, p. 21) conclusions on Hegemonic Masculinity, it is 
worth mentioning that this ideal can be related to aggression and domination. In 
accordance to a Mawdudi-inspired gender logic, Boko Haram’s Hegemonic 
Masculinity appears to acquire significance when controlling women and 
femininity. Thus, this group may have believed it was their right to kidnap the 
	 85 
Chibok Schoolgirls. Further, this aligns to what Wendt (1995, p. 70) considered 
as the creation of a structure through social practices and processes. That is, 
culture perpetuates a patriarchal structure.  
 
Regarding the paradox of men’s power, it must be mentioned that Boko 
Haram’ plight also induces fear over men and women as means of action. 
Therefore, this would explain why their militants, who are victims of the 
constraints of a toxic notion of masculinity, react violently to counter the fear of 
losing power over women. They also dread to be disempowered by the changing 
relations that education proposes. This relates to both their fading identity as 
Muslims in a globalizing Nigeria, and the contestation of women to patriarchal 
structures. As per Kaufman (1999, p. 2), gender-based violence isolates men as 
attackers, and further fuels their frustration. To illustrate the author’s arguments, 
the ethnographic study of Human Rights Watch (2014) serves to identify the 
increasing fear civilians have towards this group. 
 
On the subject of the psychic armor of manhood, it is important to recall 
Ahmed’s (2006, p. 26) elaboration on low fundamentalists. This kind of groups, 
like Boko Haram, do not cultivate both Logos and Eros. Logos, which is the 
reason, is absent form illiterate militants that form the ranks of this group. This 
aligns to Maiangwa et al.’s (2012; p. 44) findings on their economic profile. 
Being the Nigerian Government absent in the impoverished Northern States, 
religious educated boys are drawn to Boko Haram’s welfare handouts (Walker, 
2012; p. 3). Yet, more importantly, the lack of Eros, or emotion, is purposely 
meant to estrange men from women, so as to assert their masculinity. This is 
what Syed Abdul Ala Mawdudi conceived as the proper way to be a Muslim 
man (De Sondy, 2013; p. 12). As it was demonstrated in previous paragraphs, 
the Nigerian fundamentalists seem to abide by his dichotomous gender 
perspective. Furthermore, the resultant hyper-masculine environment promotes 
violence and antagonizes women, placing them as the other. Only by separating 
the feminine from the masculine, should their identity acquire significance. 
 
Masculinity as a pressure cooker is what Kaufman (1999) believes that 
encourages men into violence. In agreement with Ahmed’s (2006) theory on 
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hyper-masculinity, it appears that a dichotomous separation from the feminine 
led to repress emotion, a deemed weak characteristic. Consequently, Boko 
Haram’s militants are taught to channel this frustration with anger. Ahmed 
(2006) exemplified his argument with the Pakistani Taliban, who dismiss 
compassion and love to accentuate their power. Nevertheless, these findings 
relate to the Nigerian fundamentalists, while exploring the consequences of their 
Masculinities crisis. Given, for instance, women’s contestation of patriarchal 
traditions, the group’s gender construction is also challenged. This further 
elicited violence and resulted in the abduction of the Chibok girls. 
 
In addition, past experiences indicate that Boko Haram has been marked 
with violence. To illustrate, these previous events refer to the Government’s 
responsibility in the extrajudicial executions of some of the militants kept in 
custody in 2009 (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p 42), or the bombing attack on the 
United Nations compound (Walker; 2012; p.5-6). The history of this group and 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria is stained with blood and conflict from both 
sides. Regarding their evolution, a subject addressed in chapter I, it appears both 
militants and Nigerian security forces have exercised violence against each 
other. Therefore, knowing only brutality, they direct it to civilians as well. As a 
result, the Chibok Girls kidnapping, and the violence against their captives, 
demonstrate this point.  
 
Following Kaufman’s (1999) analysis on gender-based violence, it 
appears that Boko Haram relies on violence as a way to reclaim the privileges 
that women’s empowerment challenge. For instance, Berer & Sundari Ravidran 
(1996, p. 8) also note that fundamentalists, such as the Nigerian extremists, seek 
to reestablish a negative agency, i.e. power over someone, that has been lost. In 
result of this, women are targets of gender-based violence to the extent they 
contest their oppression. Moreover, as it was demonstrated by Mawdudi’s 
dichotomous notions of masculinity, De Sondy’s (2013, p. 11) findings indicate 
that this group believes that femininity is the antagonist of their Hegemonic 
Masculinity.   
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Boko Haram, thus, seems to be unaware of the existence of male 
privilege in Nigeria. As a result, they would not overtly declare that women’s 
empowerment threatens their idea of Hegemonic Masculinity. Rather, the 
methodological discussion of this chapter helps us to explore the unuttered 
motives behind the abductions of the Chibok schoolgirls. Education, on this 
scenario, served as the turning point that encouraged girls to rethink traditions, 
and eventually triggered a Masculinities Crisis. To illustrate this argument, let us 
consider Bathrick & Kaufman (2001, p. 2) as the authors mention that 
patriarchal power over women is only visible once it is challenged. Likewise, the 
Boko Haram’s hyper-masculine environment, which is deprived of any notion of 
femininity, furthers the construction of a toxic masculine ideal that acts on 
violence and oppression as means to retain power over women. For example, 
this aligns to Connell’s (2012) view on the fragile nature of the hierarchy of 
masculine constructions, and the alleged manhood acts that assert this binary 
conception on gender (Schrock & Schwalbe, 2009) 
 
Ahmed (2006, p. 22) states that once Patriarchy is contested by women’s 
empowerment, men react violently. The author (2006) illustrates his argument 
by considering the Pakistani Taliban. As it was noted above, these low 
fundamentalists reject notions of compassion and love, fueling their opposition 
to western education. Correspondingly, Maiangwa and Agbiboa (2014, p. 54) 
confirm that they wish to halt women’s autonomy by denying their education 
and using violence as means of reprimand. An example of this is the case of 
Malala Yousafzai, a Pakistani advocate of girls’ right to education. This girl was 
shot on the head by the Taliban in 2012 because she pledged for children to 
continue studying (Maiangwa & Agbiboa, 2014; p. 53). Furthermore, although 
the analysis on this event cannot be replicated as an explanation to the Nigerian 
case, this Dissertation contemplates their likeness. As a result, using this theory 
on the events of Chibok, it appears that a Masculinities Crisis led Boko Haram 
to act violently to deter women from undermining their identity as men.  
 
As a consequence, the Chibok schoolgirls abduction serves to identify 
the underpinning elements that led to Boko Haram’s frustration. Yet, please note 
that these findings do not attempt to blame women’s empowerment as the reason 
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behind Masculinities Crisis. Indeed, the analysis indicates that men, such as 
these militants, do feel threatened by their loss of power over women, by the 
changing power relations that are changing a patriarchal structure. Hence, I must 
stress that this work’s intentions are far from victimizing men and their fragile 
ideas on Hegemonic Masculinity. For instance, anti-feminist groups and stances 
may, in fact, interpret the analogy between women’s education and violence as a 
way to discourage women to seek a transformative and active Agency over their 
lives. This would only let the status quo remains unquestioned. Rather, this 
dissertation does the opposite. It attempts to emphasize the need to work on the 
identity of men to adapt the new power relations of both men and women. It 
seeks to prevent conflict by addressing education. 
 
3.3. Education as an Answer to Boko Haram’s Threat 
 
Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:  
(…) 
(2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to 
the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall 
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious 
groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of 
peace. 
(…) 
(United Nations, 1948) 
 
Boko Haram, experiencing a Masculinities crisis in regard to the 
changing gender norms in Nigeria, would seek to contend their ideas of 
Hegemonic Masculinity. In this manner, previous chapters addressed the 
construction of the identity to this group, and how elements, like 
fundamentalism and patriarchal traditions, map this conflict in a gender 
perspective. As it was stated, women empowerment triggers gender-based 
violence as means of restraint to maintain a status quo of both domination and 
male privilege. Yet, these findings also delineate an answer to the unequal 
setting of this situation. Although not an immediate response, transformative and 
active agency to boys and girls promises a new outlook on this conflict that can 
be included for next decision-makers. Therefore, the final part of Chapter III 
would be dedicated to examine how education can challenge this toxic notions 
of gender dichotomy.  
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Education, as it was noted on chapter II, can provide an empowering 
framework to challenge patriarchal structures and advocate for equality. 
Following this argument, the benefits of girl engaged in schools, according to 
UNICEF (2007; p. 1), include women empowerment as agents of society. It also 
involves education concerning HIV/AIDS and protection against sexual 
exploitation. Therefore, in 2007, around 900 schools received direct support 
from UNICEF, especially aimed for girls (UNICEF, 2007; p. 2). Moreover, as 
per Al-Okorie (2013, p. 272), this stance could benefit both men and women, as 
it affirms their Human Rights. Further, this would be in accordance to Article 26 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948), and 
Kabeer’s (2005) criticism on a transformative and active agency. Similarly, this 
may constitute a driving force that instills possibilities for the country’s future.  
On this matter, it is also important to note that it is a way out of poverty (Aja-
Okorie, 2013; p. 272). To illustrate, economic deprivation was considered in 
chapter I addressing the socio-economic causes of the existence of Boko Haram, 
the problems that constitute the Northern Nigerian states.  
 
This discussion is situated on the existent commitments made by the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria to fulfill Human Rights. For instance, apart from its 
dedication to the Third Millennium Development Goal, this country has 
followed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 54). 
Additionally, it supports African equivalents, such as the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 54). 
Correspondingly, the Nigerian Government has evolved its policy on Education, 
rendering it gender-focused (Aja-Okorie, 2013; p. 274). Nonetheless, as was 
noted above, it was met with a negative reaction by Boko Haram. This group, 
who despises both democratic and empowering discourses, labeled the State’s 
proposals as Western-influenced. As a blazing symbol of a real-life threat to the 
militants’ identity, the militants sought to eradicate initiatives like the Girls’ 
Secondary School in Chibok. 
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Notwithstanding, this paper does not intend to justify the Nigerian 
Government as inequality between men and women has not yet been resolved. 
Following this argument, while the Government (National Bureau of Statistics, 
2015; Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the President on MDGs, 2015) 
states that gender parity in schools has been achieved, other international 
indexes indicate otherwise, exploring different dimensions of gender equality. 
For instance, regarding the Gender Equality Index, Nigeria ranks in number 118 
out of 134 countries (Aja-Okorie, 2013; p. 274). Likewise, as the National 
Bureau of Statistics (2015) acknowledges, Northern Nigerian States show low 
literacy rates for women. Thus, this is exemplified by the Borno state’s 
government, as it considers a net attendance of girls in education of 29%, 
compared to the national average of 53% (Hatch, 2014). In addition, about 50% 
of girls in Northern Nigerian states do not engage in formal or informal 
education, a situation worsened by Boko Haram’s violence (Hatch, 2014).  
 
Moreover, as Human Rights Watch (2014, p. 55) also states, Boko 
Haram undermines the right to education of every child, not only girls. I 
consider important to recall the almajeri syndrome in Northern Nigeria, as boys 
are taught under fundamentalists teachings that perpetuate poverty, while girls 
are neglected from the public sphere altogether. In addition, I believe this is 
what Molara Ogundipe-Leslie conceived as patriarchal traditions in her country. 
Therefore, I stress the declarations of the United Nations Development Fund for 
Women, an entity that conceived gender perspectives in education as a way to 
prevent conflict, early as 2001. Their conclusions seem to be applicable to the 
Nigerian case in regard to the abductions of schoolgirls. Yet, to fully 
comprehend the extent of such answer, it is important to consider the context 
where the Nigerian Government, and organizations like the United Nations, 
operate.  
 
In agreement with Uchendu’s (2007) and NSRP & V4C’s (2016) 
qualitative studies, Patriarchy appears to be related to Nigerian traditions 
(Asiyanbola, 2005; p. 2). Furthermore, it dates back before Boko Haram, to 
today’s Nigeria’s XIX century. In the case of the country’s colonial past, both 
culture and social constructions stressed the difference between men and 
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women, while imposing a servitude role for women. Additionally, these notions 
seem to have endured the passage of time. For instance, as for 2016, Nigerians 
associated Masculinity with a lack of emotion and power, and femininity with 
submission and caregiving (NSRP & V4C, 2016). Other gender roles, for 
instance, emphasized the importance of marriage and the authority men wield 
over their families (Uchendu, 2007). These unequal power relations between 
men and women interiorized the idea of male privilege. In this regard, it is 
important to think back to Bharucha (1995, pg. 1610), who established that 
masculinity is a political and social construction that depends on Patriarchy. 
 
On this matter, dichotomous views on masculinity/femininity have been 
perpetuated through cultural constructions and interactions. For instance, men in 
this country are entitled to participate in the public sphere, outside the household 
domain (Asiyanbola, 2005; p. 2), while women remain relegated to it. As a way 
to separate the masculine and the feminine, boys have a higher access and 
enrollment in education than girls. Yet, this dissertation contemplates the 
possibility of an inclusive perspective in schools that would counter toxic 
notions of Hegemonic Masculinity. This should address Ahmed’s (2006, p. 27) 
study, as men tend to be deviated from women from an early age to construct 
their identity as masculine beings. 
 
According to Lemon (1995, p. 63), men define their Hegemonic 
Masculinity by contrasting it against notions of femininity. Consequently, the 
hyper-masculine environment, a space deprived from notions of emotion, sustain 
gender division, further providing a thriving scenario for low fundamentalist 
groups like Boko Haram. Gender education, nevertheless, could challenge these 
views while also encouraging women empowerment (Asiyanbola, 2005; p. 2). 
As it involves children and young adults, this perspective can prevent patriarchal 
values to establish rigid notions of both masculinity and femininity, thus 
constructing their identity with no opposition to each other. Also, it would avoid 
the what Schrock and Schwalbe (2009) defined as manhood acts that perpetuate 
oppression and a negative agency over women.  
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This inclusive education contrasts with other perspective, especially 
regarding Nigerian Northern states. For instance, makarantan boko, or Western 
education schools, are dismissed in this region (Danjibo, 2009; p. 8), an action 
that could also be interpreted as a way to stress a fundamentalist masculinity, 
deviating from the Government’s discourse. Moreover, low fundamentalists like 
Boko Haram, characterized by illiteracy and religious fanaticism, denounce the 
loss of traditions that studying could carry. Aja-Okorie (2013) mentions, for 
instance, that cultivated girls tend to choose to be wedded at 25 or 30 years old, 
a contraposition to Nigerian patriarchal culture.  
 
Accordingly, let us contemplate on Abubakar Shekau’s, Boko Haram’s 
leader, statement on this regard: “Western education is sin, it is forbidden, and 
women must go and marry” (Human Rights Watch, 2014; p. 20). In turn, the 
frustration of this group’s Hegemonic Masculinity could be envisioned as a 
crisis of power legitimacy (Lemon, 1995; p. 68). Nevertheless, if male privilege 
is to be contested from educational institutions, it needs to address gender 
constructions for both girls and boys. On this regard, the Government’s intent on 
women’s empowerment was already questioned on its efficiency. Now, a new 
solution can integrate both women and men to generate a social perspective that 
is aware of the inequalities in the country. For this reason, men and boys need to 
be also considered as subjects of policy-making, as women and girls move to 
their traditionally-held spheres. Should this Masculinities crisis be unattended, 
resulting manhood acts will follow (Lemon, 1995; p. 69). 
 
The new gender-empowering perspective should align with African 
Feminists’ claims to include men in their path to construct a new continent (da 
Silva, 2004, p. 135). Likewise, following Connell’s (2005) Masculinity Theory, 
they should be involved in the feminist movement, identifying them as human 
beings instead of oppressors that are prone to violence (Connell, 2005; p. 9). 
Following this argument, Kaufman (1999, p. 5) acknowledges that it is 
necessary to involve men and boys to end violence by first rejecting its 
patriarchal nature, but at the same time making them part of the change. On this 
point, I should stress that my previous remarks were meant as a way to avoid 
conflict. For instance, if masculinity depends on patriarchal constructions, an 
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identity crisis will be triggered on each occasion minorities denounce them. 
Therefore, without disregarding the experiences of women, men should be 
encouraged to acknowledge the privilege they possess, and actively join a quest 
for equality.  
 
For instance, let us bear in mind Fried’s (2003, p. 106-107) agreement 
with an educational solution to end gender-based violence. His considerations 
include empowering women and girls and providing an egalitarian legal 
framework, while also stressing the importance of literacy and education. The 
Federal Republic of Nigeria appears to follow these recommendations with its 
2006 Gender Policy on female education (ActionAid, 2012; p. 8) and its efforts 
to attain gender parity in school (National Bureau of Statistics, 2015; Office of 
the Senior Special Assistant to the President on MDGs, 2015). Yet, although the 
Government fulfilled its commitment on the Third Millennium Development 
Goal, its policies did not fathom how to include boys in such initiatives.  
 
CHART No. 8 
Gender Perspectives in Education, an Empowering Proposal 
Source: Bathrick & Kaufman (2001), Kabeer (2005), Aja-Okorie (2013) 
Produced by: Néstor Guillermo Silverio Torres 
 
•Reconceptualize patriarchal traditions
•Rethink binary gender perceptions
•Include both men and women 
•Encourage a transformative and active perspectives
Agency
•Gender perspectives in education 
•Sensibilization on male privilege 
•Feminist perspective on equality
•Gender-based violence analysis
Resources
•Men to consider new masculinities outside authority and violence
•Both women and men to contest patriarchal cultural norms 
•Deconstruct notions of the other
Achievements
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Following Kabeer’s (2005) criticism on true empowerment, Chart No. 8 
summarizes an educational proposal to include boys and girls in gender equality. 
In terms of Agency, this idea encourages both an active and transformative 
perspective that contests the present dichotomy in Nigeria. Moreover, regarding 
resources, it is important to mention that feminist views in school may help 
youth to acknowledge male privilege to further challenge it and other patriarchal 
cultural norms.  
 
As means of illustration, Bathrick and Kaufman (2001, p. 3) state that in 
order for men to acknowledge male privilege, they must listen to the experiences 
of women (Bathrick & Kaufman, 2001; p. 2). The authors’ thesis insists in 
exploring the results of engaging women in gender equality, while at the same 
time challenging male privileges (Bathrick & Kaufman, 2001; p. 3). In like 
manner, to end gender-based violence, a profound reconceptualization of power 
relations is needed (Kaufman, 1999; p. 4). It is also important to challenge the 
toxic notions of masculinity, basing on principles of respect and love (Kaufman, 
1999; p. 4). Nevertheless, I must stress that this proposal must be envisioned 
from a local perspective. Following a post-colonial thinking, I cannot endorse 
this solution without considering the perspectives of Nigerians, and their own 
culture, to work for gender equality. 
 
Thus, echoing Aja-Okorie’s (2013; p. 280) recommendations to the 
Nigerian government, it is important to conceive a different solution to the Boko 
Haram conflict. In this way, including a gender equality perspective in schools. 
For instance, the Nigerian Government has fulfilled its commitments regarding 
gender parity in school, and has modified its policies aiming to encourage girls’ 
enrollment in educational institutions. Nevertheless, this public actions have not 
addressed the gender constructions boys face. Moreover, given the unyielding 
dichotomous traditions on masculinity/femininity, women’s empowerment is 
condemned while men, like Boko Haram, attempt to assert the male privileges 
that were contested using violence. This final part of chapter III explores 
possible ways of including men in gender equality, so as to encourage them to 
acknowledge their privileges and reconsider their gender constructions. For 
instance, if they are truly involved in the de-construction of toxic notions of 
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masculinity, conflict and violence may be prevented. Men, therefore, would no 
longer would respond to a fading Hegemonic Masculinity that is fueled by the 
fear of losing power over women. 
 
In this manner, the methodological discussion of this chapter referred to 
the specific objective of interpreting Boko Haram’s terrorist response to girls’ 
empowerment through education, using Gender Theory. This seems to indicate 
that these insurgents are, in fact, against women’s education. It must be noted, 
nonetheless, that this conception is alien to the group, who has thrived under 
fundamentalism and patriarchal traditions of Northern Nigerian states, and in 
opposition to democracy and Western values. On this matter, the Sharia-abiding 
region imposes a dichotomous view on masculinity and femininity, educating 
boys with fundamentalists teachings, while at the same time relegating women 
to the household domain. Therefore, Boko Haram, following a Mawdudi-
inspired view on masculinity, believes that women are not meant to go to school. 
Consequently, they abducted 276 girls from a Government School in Chibok. 
This, considered to be a manhood act to assert masculinity and reestablish 
traditions, is proof of how a Hegemonic Masculinity in crisis may elicit gender-
based violence. Nevertheless, there seems to be a solution regarding this 
conflict. Aside from only considering gender parity a success in Nigeria, 
governmental decision-makers should consider including men in their policies. 
Further, an inclusive empowering education for both boys and girls may help to 
contest patriarchal customs and avoid constructing an identity in terms of the 
other. If we are to attain equality, we should understand gender outside toxic and 
unyielding social norms. 
  
	 96 
VI. ANALYSIS  
 
This dissertation’s general objective was to analyze the response of the 
extremist group known as Boko Haram to girl education taking as an example 
the kidnapping of the Chibok girls in 2014. In accordance to this, I considered a 
comparing and contrasting research methodology to examine secondary-source 
ethnographic studies on Nigerian gender constructions, and other qualitative data 
concerning this country. Moreover, combined with a post-colonial approach, my 
work was meant to explore the subject of study, rather than attempt to explain 
this situation. For this reason, I mostly refer to Connell’s Masculinities Theory, 
as well as African Feminism and local perspectives of gender equality, to 
comprehend how this group shapes its identity in terms of what they define as 
being a man. Thus, I decided to investigate how a Patriarchal structure of power 
can be perpetuated by practices, while also using violence as a deterrence to 
challenge agencies that seek to de-construct it.  
 
Moreover, this research was divided into three chapters, each aiming to 
explore a different trait of Boko Haram’s Identity. Thus, chapter I was designed 
to analyze the context that led to the emergence of these militants. Chapter II, on 
the other hand, studies the existence of a crisis of Masculinities that is caused by 
women empowerment through education. Further, chapter III interprets this 
group’s terrorist response to girls’ empowerment through education using 
Gender Theory. As noted, every part illustrated a complementary perspective on 
gender constructions that involved history, fundamentalism, and agency.  
 
On this matter, following the historic account of Boko Haram, it appears 
that this group has been influenced by two opposing phenomena. In the 
international context, while Globalization stressed the importance of democracy 
and secularization, an opposing perspective to Muslim peoples appeared 
following the attacks of 9/11. This encouraged sentiments of Islamophobia and 
further tarnished the image of the West for Islamic extremists. Moreover, in a 
local context, Nigeria experiences a fundamentalist revival following the 
adoption of Sharia Law in the impoverished Northern states, which accentuated 
their opposition to a westernized South.  
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Nevertheless, this division between Northern and Southern states has 
been shaped by different circumstances. For instance, dating back to Nigeria’s 
colonial past, the British rule over the country accentuated the cultural distance 
amid regions by emphasizing the role of northern emirs to counter external, and 
southern, influence. Likewise, these practices perpetuated certain traditions that 
conceived gender in binary terms. For instance, customary religious views 
stressed the separation of men and women; the former being relegated to the 
private sphere with specific obligations, like marrying and being a mother. Thus, 
this local structure firstly reacted in the eighties, as the first religious group, 
Maitatsine, rose to oppose the alleged moral decay of the country. Although 
their insurgency lasted until 1985, it marked a precedent on how identity defined 
agency.  
 
Following the return to democratic civilian rule in 1999, the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria stressed the possibility for states to abide by the Sharia law. 
The Northern region, therefore, accepted the change to counter the supposed 
corruption of the ruling elite. Meanwhile, the conflict between the Government 
and a preaching group escalated. Known as Boko Haram, these insurgents 
condemned constitutional secularity and Western-like education and values. 
They based their behavior in a Salafi stance that vowed to return to religious 
traditions, while also being influenced by the two main branches of Islam. For 
instance, according to a Shiite perspective, they opposed democracy, while 
abiding to a Sunni approach for a pure Islamic State.  
 
In 2009, tensions were at their highest when the government murdered 
Muhammad Yusuf, the then-leader of Boko Haram, in an extrajudicial 
execution. Abubakar Shekau assumed the direction of this group and followed 
the fundamentalist perspective of his predecessor. In this point, it is important to 
mention that, coming from the state of Borno, a patriarchal structure has greatly 
determined the construction of their identity. To illustrate, African Feminists 
perspectives, such as Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, have stated that traditions are 
responsible for gender inequality. Moreover, the dynamics of the Northern states 
supports her thesis. For instance, the lack of presence of the Federal Government 
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to relieve welfare needs, and the unyielding customary views of these states, 
accentuated a socio-economic background for the emergence of groups like 
Boko Haram.  
 
Furthermore, the patriarchal structure for this region perpetuates the 
gender roles assigned to women, as they are expected to marry before they end 
their studies. Men, nevertheless, are influenced by an almajeri syndrome, a 
consequence of fundamentalists teachings directed at boys that encourages them 
to beg on the streets to earn money and sustain themselves and their teachers. 
Qualitative and ethnographic studies, in addition, evidence that masculinity is 
constructed in terms of power over family and violence, deprived from any 
notion of emotion. This aligns with the conception of low fundamentalists, who 
are characterized by illiteracy and lack of both Eros (sensitivity) and Logos 
(reason), thus establishing a hyper-masculine environment. Femininity, on the 
other hand, depends on submission and caregiving.  
 
Moreover, bearing in mind that Boko Haram acts according to this 
construction, it seems likely that this group complies by a Mawdudi-inspired 
view on masculinity. These teachings define what it is to be man in opposition to 
God, the West, and Women. The Nigerian fundamentalists thus exemplify this 
argument by firstly condemning mainstream Islam in Nigeria. They also 
denounce western-like conceptions of democracy and secularization. And, in 
their attempt to assert their identity, they estrange women as the other. 
Following Connell’s gender hierarchy, it appears that Boko Haram is, in fact, 
struggling to position their perception of Hegemonic Masculinity in their 
country. Moreover, this idea, which is meant to be contested, can react violently 
to re-establish itself within the structure.  
 
Regarding girls’ education, the research shows that the Nigerian 
government has committed to the United Nations’ Third Millennium 
Development Goal. The State’s position praises its accomplished gender parity 
in schools. On this matter, empowerment is conceived as pursuing studies to 
encourage a transformative and active agency that contests customs, while 
stressing the ability to regain autonomy and power to decide over their lives. 
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Qualitative studies demonstrate, for instance, that women enrolled at schools are 
challenging traditions like early marriage. They are also more prone not to be 
subjects of inequality, as they have more opportunity for employment. 
Nevertheless, a closer examination on the low women literacy rate illustrates 
that Northern states still enforce a patriarchal structure.  
 
Therefore, the analysis shows how the abduction of the Chibok 
schoolgirls, in fact, is a manhood act that deters women’s empowerment to 
assert a patriarchal structure. This is mainly due to a Masculinities crisis that has 
been triggered by the contestation of the region’s traditions. This has turned to 
gender-based violence to re-establish the previous status quo and power 
relations. Further, this event exemplifies how male privilege was perpetuated 
through practices, thus consolidating in this way an entitlement over women.  
 
Nonetheless, this dissertation concludes on the exploration of education 
as a countering reaction to this problem. The idea invites decision-makers to 
conceive empowerment while involving boys against gender constructions and 
toxic notions of masculinity. For instance, this would avoid further conflict, as 
men would no longer construct their identity in terms of opposition to the other. 
Consequently, a new way to be a man will be envisioned, casting aside notions 
of power and authority, to further challenge the patriarchal structure. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Thus, the concluding remarks for this research are as follows:  
 
• The aftermath of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, triggered the so-called 
War on Terror, the same which targeted Muslim people as terrorists and incited 
Islamophobia. Consequently, the Muslim World opposed the already 
deteriorated image of the United States. This served as a political background 
for the emergence of Boko Haram, and the construction of its identity.  
 
• Western perspective on Globalization involves secularization and democracy, 
placing them as political outcomes that countries should seek. On this matter, 
Globalization, under Naim’s perspective, furthers the complexity of local 
identities, as they are exposed to a cultural homogenization.  
 
• Globalization is considered a threat to groups like Boko Haram, as it promotes 
democracy and secularization, and places religion at the personal sphere. The 
loss of importance of religion provoked conflict as it is considered a loss of 
identity as well.  
 
• Fundamentalism is a reactionary force to Globalization, as it seeks to assert 
religious identity while opposing interaction between different cultures. Boko 
Haram’s identity is also based upon this stance.   
 
• Boko Haram’s hatred towards the Nigerian state is due to the Government’s 
repressive use of the force. Its actions are, therefore, fueled by the condemnation 
of its members to extrajudicial executions in 2009, as it vows to establish a pure 
and non-corrupted Islamic State. 
 
• The Nigerian State has failed to provide education, shelter and jobs for the 
youth, who became increasingly captivated by the welfare handouts of Boko 
Haram.  
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• Boko Haram’s opposition to the Nigerian government is founded on claims of 
corruption and moral decay, thus looking for an Islamic State ruled by Sharia 
Law. The indiscriminate use of force by the Government further fuels their 
arguments on this matter.  
 
• Both Boko Haram and its predecessor, Maitatsine, shared similarities concerning 
their identity and their appearance. For instance, the Maitatsine group was also 
the outcome of a compilation of economic, political and religious elements on an 
impoverished Northern Nigeria.  
 
• In 1999, Nigeria returned to civilian rule and adopted a new Constitution that 
ratified State secularity, while at the same time recognized Sharia Law. This 
furthered the division between North and South, being the Northern States 
where Sharia Law would be used as Criminal Law.  
 
• Boko Haram considered that Sharia Law alone could not save Nigeria, and 
demanded a full Islamic State.  
 
• Boko Haram’s founder, Muhammad Yusuf, used different Islamic conservative 
currents to construct Boko Haram’s religious identity. Yusuf, for instance, based 
upon Shiite stances to condemn democracy and Western influences. He also 
considered Sunnism on his demands for an Islamic State. Finally, he abided by 
Salafist teachings, to sustain Boko Haram’s literal interpretation to the Quran. 
Consequently, he assembled a religious exclusivism that denounced dissident 
perspectives outside Boko Haram.  
 
• Concerning the gender construction of Boko Haram, this group seems to follow 
a Mawdudi-inspired logic of Masculinity, as it defines what it is to be a man in 
opposition to the West, God and Women.  
 
• Low Fundamentalists, like Boko Haram conceive gender in binary terms and use 
religion as a banner to further their political and patriarchal agendas.     
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• Nigerians seem to have certain gender construction, regardless of their 
educational background. For instance, men are thought to be masculine to the 
extent of their power over women and their children. Women, on the other hand, 
are expected to be submissive and follow traditional roles of mother and 
caregiver.  
 
• Unyielding and dichotomous notions regarding gender may elicit conflict if 
these are contested. Therefore, Masculinities crisis are the result of men losing 
authority over women. Regarding Boko Haram, and Nigeria in general, an 
empowering education that encouraged girls to abandon traditional gender 
norms may trigger this type of crisis, and may consequently involve violence to 
reclaim the former status quo.  
 
• Following Kaufman’s theory on gender-based violence, it can be further 
deduced that Masculinity crisis are the consequence of a contestation to male 
privilege, resulting in the use of violence to deter a change in power relations. 
Nigeria’s traditions, accentuating unyielding notions of masculinity and 
femininity, are thus considered to be the previous reigning order with given 
gender norms for women.  
 
• Ethnographic studies on Nigerian young population of youth, whose age ranged 
from twenty to twenty-seven years old, show that men and women consider 
masculinity as a matter of authority and power over the family. Likewise, ideal 
femininity is deemed as submission and caregiving. Nevertheless, these 
traditional notions are changing with new generations, as women are granted the 
access tp education and employment. Therefore, traditional gender norms, such 
as early motherhood, are being contested  
 
• The contestation of culture and traditions through empowerment may lead 
groups like Boko Haram to use gender-based violence to reclaim the power they 
held over women. Thus, the opposition discourse these extremist had regarding 
the West and democracy is combined with their failing ability to adapt to 
different power relations. 
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• The Nigerian Government acknowledges the progress made to ensure Gender 
Parity in School, towards achieving the Third Millennium Development Goal. 
Nevertheless, it also recognizes a patriarchal culture present in the Northern 
states. In the area of influence of Boko Haram, the Sharia-law region, literacy 
rates for women range from 10% to 20%. 
 
• Women’s education in Nigeria seems to have a positive impact, encouraging 
both a transformative and active agency against patriarchal traditions. For 
instance, according to ActionAid (2012), in 2008 41% of the girls enrolled in 
their Transformative Education Program believed that early marriage was an 
obstacle to finishing their studies. By 2012, the percentage dropped to 28%. In 
this manner, it appears that girls are contesting traditions related to motherhood.  
 
• Northern Nigerian States are exposed to makarantan addini or the schools for 
religious instruction, and makarantan allo or Qur’anic schools, instead of 
western education. Principally aimed at male children, this type of education 
results in an almajeri syndrome, where boys are expected to beg to earn a living. 
This kind of education, contrasting to the official discourse on women 
empowerment, is neither active nor transformative.  
 
• Boko Haram, following a Mawdudi-inspired gender construction, dismissed 
girls’ education as a Western invention alien to the traditions they bowed to 
protect. Women’s empowerment thus triggers a Masculinities Crisis, which in 
turn elicits violence and manhood acts, like the Chibok Schoolgirls abduction, as 
means to re-establish previous cultural status quo.  
 
• The Chibok schoolgirls abduction was not a preordained event. Rather, it 
occurred once Boko Haram did not find obstacles to detain them. Yet, this event 
also exemplifies the underlying male privilege that sustains the entitlement over 
women’s bodies. Following the official discourse on gender parity in 
educational institutions, girls did not follow traditions on gender roles, such as 
early marriage. Boko Haram, therefore, relied on the abduction to deter further 
questioning to their patriarchal culture.  
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• Boko Haram’s Mawdudi-inspired dichotomous gender notions, alongside 
patriarchal traditions that relegated women to a private sphere, provide the 
sustain for their actions. For instance, being a Government School, under an 
official commitment to United Nations’ Third Millennium Development Goal, 
and located in the Christian area of Borno, the Chibok abduction is considered a 
manhood act, as it expresses and asserts their Hegemonic Masculinity ideal over 
a threat to their identity.  
 
• Boko Haram’s Masculinity crisis responds to the progress made by an active and 
transformative agency that challenges gender relations. While their idea of 
Hegemonic Masculinity is sustained by patriarchal traditions, they enact gender-
based violence to assert a negative agency over women.  
 
• New educational proposals should include both boys and girls to deconstruct 
binary gender perspectives and contest patriarchal traditions.  
 
• Boys should be encouraged in school to acknowledge their male privilege and to 
avoid toxic Hegemonic Masculinity. 
 
• By also empowering boys in gender perspectives, and deconstructing patriarchal 
notions on traditions, they could avoid estranging women as the other, in 
relation to whom they need to assert their masculinity.  
 
• Following a post-colonial perspective, this new educational proposal should be 
culturally sensitive, taking into account local perspectives of equality instead of 
generalizing men and women as objects of study.  
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APPENIXES 
APPENDIX No.1: 
Glossary of Terms 
 
• Abubakar Shekau: The leader of Boko Haram that enacted the Chibok 
Schoolgirls’ Abduction in 2014 (Thurston, 2016; p. 14). He assumed the 
direction of the Nigerian militants in 2009, after Mohammed Yusuf was 
murdered in an extrajudicial execution. He followed his predecessor’s salafi 
stance. 
 
• African Feminism: A current of though in the Feminist movement that 
proposes to de-construct gendered images of womanhood and contest customary 
roles assigned to them. It also emphasizes the need to include men in the 
reconstruction of the African continent (da Silva, 2004, p. 130-135). 
 
• Agency: Defined under a feminist perspective, agency refers to the ability to act 
in accordance to power. Therefore, a negative agency relates to authority over 
someone, while a positive one considers power to do something. Following the 
Empowerment Theory, agency needs to be both transformative, as it opposes a 
patriarchal structure, and active, as it encourages the will to change the status 
quo of disempowerment (Kabeer, 2005; p. 14-15). 
 
• Almajeri syndrome: A social phenomenon that occurs in Northern Nigerian 
states, where boys who are educated under fundamentalists teachings are forced 
to beg in the streets, so as to earn a living for themselves and for their teachers 
(Danjibo, 2009; p. 8). 
 
• Boko Haram: The subject of study of this dissertation, Boko Haram is an 
extremist fundamentalist group that originated in Maiduguri, Borno State. 
Known under different forms from 1995, their original name is Jama'atu Ahlis 
Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the 
Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), Boko Haram is the name Nigerians gave to the 
militants, meaning “Western Education is Anathema”. This group opposes 
democracy and “western values” and has shifted his attacks to civilians since 
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2001. It has vowed to establish an Islamic State with a ruling unaltered Sharia 
Law for all Nigerians (Krech, 2011; p. 132. Onuaha, 2010; p. 55. Walker, 2012; 
p. 1. Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 45). 
 
• Borno: The far-eastern Northern state of Borno holds the hometown for Boko 
Haram, the city of Maiduguri. This is also the state where the Chibok abductions 
took place. Abiding by Sharia Law, this region has a literacy rate for women of 
20% (The National Bureau of Statistics, 2015). 
 
• Crisis of Masculinities: This refers to the ensuing frustration of unyielding 
gender notions for men once that, in a patriarchal structure, male privilege is 
contested. It relates mainly to the construction of identity, and is triggered by the 
empowerment of minorities, like homosexuals and women (Lemon, 1995; p. 
62). 
 
• Disempowerment: In contraposition to Empowerment, Disempowerment refers 
to a situation where a group of people who once possessed power, had it taken 
from them (Kabeer, 2005; p. 13-14). 
 
• Empowerment: Conceived under the terms of agency, resources, and 
achievements, Empowerment relates to a situation where a group of people 
reclaims power (Kabeer, 2005; p. 13-15). For this dissertation, I mostly consider 
Empowerment through education. 
 
• Fundamentalism: A countering reaction to globalization and the loss of 
customs, Fundamentalism encourages literal, and often, misconceptions, of 
religious texts and religious exclusivism. In turn, High Fundamentalism refers to 
and educated group of people that encourages traditions. On the other hand, Low 
Fundamentalism involves illiteracy and violence. Both forms are repressive 
towards women (Ahmed, 2006; p. 26. Emerson and Hartman, 2006; p. 130-131). 
Moreover, on this Dissertation, Low Fundamentalism is analyzed in regard to its 
connection to Boko Haram  
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• Gardawa: These are known to be Islamic scribe’s disciples in Nigeria, who 
lived on the charity of pious Muslims, and were the followers of the first 
fundamentalist group of the country, Maitatsine (Adesoji, 2011; p. 102). 
 
• Gender Dichotomy: Or binary perspectives on gender. A social structure that 
divides both the feminine from the masculine. Being an irreconcilable gap 
between men and women, it perpetuates gender roles assigned to them. It also 
constitutes part of the construction of the identity of Boko Haram, defining it 
against a notion of the other (De Sondy, 2013; p. 12). 
 
• Gender Parity Index: An international Index that measures women’s assistance 
to educational institutions in regard to men’s. It has been used by the Nigerian 
Government to identify its progress in relation to girl’s empowerment in 
education (The National Bureau of Statistics, 2015; p. 7). 
 
• Gender-based Violence: A type of violence directed especially towards women 
and girls. Moreover, the root causes for this violent behavior stems from a 
Masculinity Crisis, of men failing to adapt to a loss of authority over women, 
and of their male privilege (Fried, 2003; p. 96. Kaufman, 1999; p. 1-4) 
 
• Global South: In opposition to the North, this term relates to countries that have 
been labeled as underdeveloped, and that usually are found in the southern 
hemisphere. It is usually used in post-colonial production (Mohanty, 1988; p. 
338). Other similar terms used throughout this Dissertation refers to the relation 
of Western and Eastern societies.  
 
• Globalization: A social historic process of interconnectedness that has stressed 
western conceptions of democracy and secularization. Although it primarily 
focuses on a cultural homogenization, it also accentuates local identities 
rendering them more complex (Emerson & Hartman, 2006; p. 129. Naím, 2009; 
p. 29).  
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• Hadiths: Islamic traditions that were passed down by Prophet Muhammed (De 
Sondy, 2013; p. 10). 
 
• Hegemonic Masculinity: Following the plurality of Masculinities, Hegemonic 
Masculinity is the ideal form of being a man regarding a gender hierarchy. 
Although unattainable, this idea shapes the identity of men and boys in each 
society. It depends on local, regional and global contexts, and responds to every 
manifestation to Patriarchy. It is also meant to be contested, and is seen as a 
solution to assert a patriarchal structure (Connell, 2000-2016). 
 
• Hyper-masculinity: In a low fundamentalist scenario, it states a structure where 
both Logos (reason) and Logos (emotion) is absent. Further, it lacks any notion 
of femininity, such as compassion and love, as they are deemed as weakness, 
encouraging violence and authority (Ahmed, 2006; p. 26). 
 
• Islamophobia: A term firstly used in the 1997 Runnymede Trust report, 
Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All. Since 2001, it has acknowledged the 
violent behavior of a western-globalization perspective that generalizes Muslim 
people as terrorists (Baleich, 2012; p. 180). 
 
• Izala: Considered as the group that advocated for a Salafi stance in Nigeria. It 
was founded in 1978 by Abubakar Gumi, under the name of Jama’at Izalat al-
Bid’a wa-Iqamat al-Sunna (The Society for the Removal of Heretical 
Innovation and the Prophet’s Model). Izala considered that Nigerians had no 
proper knowledge of Islam (Thurston, 2016; p. 10). 
 
• Izhar al-din: A term that denotes the expression of Islamic faith through public 
actions (Thurston, 2016; p. 12). 
 
• Jihad: The struggle against what opposes Islam. Under Boko Haram’s 
perspective, their jihad is meant to be against the corrupted secular Federal 
Republic of Nigeria (Walker, 2012; p. 3).  
 
	 120 
• Makarantan: Makarantan refers to the different types of education in Nigeria. 
Makarantan addini, for instance, considers the schools for religious instruction. 
Makarantan allo, on the other hand makes reference to the Qur’anic 
institutions. Contrastingly, Makarantan boko involves the Western-education 
schools opposed by Boko Haram and characterized by secularity. 
 
• Male Privilege: In a Patriarchal Structure, male privilege relates to the benefits 
men are taught for being men. In the Nigerian case, for instance, this refers to 
the servitude of women to men. Moreover, this construction is oblivious to men, 
and once it is contested, may create conflict to assert the previous status quo 
(Connell, 2015; p. 6. Lemon, 19995; p. 69. Uchendu, 2007. Uchendu, 2007; p. 
292) 
 
• Manhood Acts: Bearing in mind that masculinity is a socio-political 
construction, and that it acquires significance through practice, Manhood Acts 
are the actions meant to conceive dominance over others, assert male privilege 
privilege, maintain women’s disempowerment and avoid exploitation (Schrock 
& Schwalbe, 2009; p. 281). For instance, this Dissertation considers Boko 
Haram’s Chibok Abduction an example of manhood acts. 
 
• Maitatsine: A word from Hausa that means the one who damns, this is the name 
of the first fundamentalist group in Nigeria whose uprising occurred from 1980 
to 1985. Founded by Muhammadu Marwa, they were known for a hostility to 
the Nigerian State and Western technology. It predated Boko Haram, yet also 
shared some characteristics with the latter, like their religious exclusivist stance 
(Adesoji, 2011; p. 101-104). 
 
• Mohammed Yusuf: Arguably, Boko Haram’s founder. Yusuf was firstly 
enrolled with Salafists groups in Nigeria, of whom he learned fundamentalism 
and religious exclusivism. He was killed in 2009, in a extrajudicial execution by 
security Nigerian forces, although the Government maintains that he was shot 
while trying to escape. Abubakar Shekau assumed the group’s leadership 
following his demise (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 45. Thurston, 2016; p. 10). 
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• Patriarchy: Considered to be a structure perpetuated by social practices and 
processes (Wendt, 1995; p- 70-73), Patriarchy relates to the system that sustains 
male privilege and encourages Hegemonic Masculinity for men. It is also 
founded on a negative agency of power over women.  
 
• Post-colonialism: Or Postcolonial Feminism. This refers as a theoretical 
movement that denounces a theoretical conquest of the West (or the Global 
North) over other academic production, seemingly referencing historic 
imperialism. On a feminist perspective, it encourages a critical appropriation of 
western gender equality production, while emphasizing local voices and 
experiences. It also denies considering women, and men, as homogeneous 
objects of study with ill-fitting assumptions that attempt to explain patriarchy as 
a universal occurrence. Rather, it stresses that gender inequality happens 
differently in each context, and that theory should be used to explore the conflict 
rather than to describe it (Mohanty, 1988; p. 336-340) 
 
• Power Relations: Also, Gender Relations. According to Empowerment studies, 
Power Relations revolve around the interconnections of the existent structure 
between the disempowered and the ones who took power from them. As the 
reigning status quo, it can be contested, requiring active and transformative 
agency (Kabeer, 2005; p. 14). 
 
• Religious Exclusivism: A fundamentalist that states that places a given 
religious perspective among the others. Recalling Salafism, Boko Haram 
exemplifies a posture known as al-wala’ wa-l-bara’, or loyalty to those 
considered true Muslims and rejection to all infidels (Thurston, 2016; p. 12).  
 
• Salafism: An orthodox Muslim ideology that concerns only literal interpretation 
of the Quran. Although a minority in Northern Nigeria, this stance was adopted 
by Yusuf, who later instilled it in the Boko Haram worldview (Thurston, 2016; 
p. 9-10).  
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• Secularization: A characteristic of western democratic societies that divides 
Politics from religion, placing the latter in the individual’s sphere (Emerson & 
Hartman, 2006; p. 127 – 128). 
 
• Sharia Law: This refers to a legal system that abides mainly by the teachings of 
the Quran and those of Prophet Mohammed. In Nigeria, Northern States adopted 
it as a countering reaction to the South and in an attempt to remain faithful to 
their moral conceptions (Maiangwa et al., 2012; p. 50. Thurston, 2016; p. 11). 
 
• Shiites: One of the two main currents of Islam, Shiites believe that their religion 
should be practiced in its pure and unaltered form, condemning the Democratic 
State (Danjibo, 2009; p. 4. Adesoji, 2010; p. 99). Boko Haram is inspired by this 
opposition to the Government. 
 
• Structure: In contraposition to Agency, Structure refers to social constructions 
that are sustained by shared perceptions and knowledge of ideas and traditions, 
also perpetuated by practices and processes (Wendt, 1995; p.70-73). In this 
Dissertation, Patriarchy is the Structure analyzed. 
 
• Sunnites: As the other current in Islam, Sunnis believe that their religion can be 
incorporated into societies and governments (Danjibo, 2009; p. 4). Thus, Boko 
Haram also aligns with this stance when demanding an Islamic Nigerian State. 
 
• Syed Abdul Ala Mawdudi: An Islamic political personality, Mawdudi was 
known for his elaborations on gender constructions for devout Muslim men. 
Although his teachings were known in Post-imperial India, they have been taken 
by other charismatic Islamic leaders. Mawdudi states that masculinity is defined 
in opposition to three other concepts: God, the West, and women (De Sondy, 
2013; p. 12). Boko Haram seems to align with this perspective. 
 
• West: Compared to the Global North, the West refers to democratic and secular 
societies, such as the United States. Boko Haram also includes a set of values, 
such as empowerment and equality, as part of the West, and thus labels the 
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United Nations, and its perspectives, as western-oriented. Moreover, concerning 
post-colonialism, this term describes, for instance, the stance of a power elite, 
usually white, that believes that experiences are the same for everyone. 
 
• War on Terror: A new security perspective furthered by the United States 
President, George W. Bush, after the 9/11 attacks. As a discourse, it generalized 
Islam with terrorism, and consequently triggered Islamophobia (Rajwade, 2006; 
p. 4863). 
 
• Yan Tatsi: The fundamentalists Nigerians that founded the first religious 
extremist group in Nigeria, Maitatsine (Adesoji, 2011; p. 102). 
